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INTRODUCTION
The confrontations between Congress and the first Reagan
Administration over executive privilege1 made apparent the
lack of well-ordered processes for resolving interbranch disputes over access to important information in the hands of the
executive branch.2 This is troubling because the invocation of
executive privilege against Congress raises obvious and important questions of government accountability. Indeed, because
Congress's entitlement to such information presents serious
legal questions, the lack of clear processes for resolution calls
into question the customary claim that ours is a "government of
laws." The more Congress's access to information about the executive branch seems subject to vagaries of politics, rather than
to processes of law, the greater the apparent gap between our
ideals of government accountability and the reality of government practice.
Confrontations as intense as those provoked in recent
1. In particular, the controversies stemmed from executive officials' attempts to deny Congress access to certain executive reports. See infra notes
117-88 and accompanying text.
2. Indeed, the 1982-83 confrontation between Congress and the executive
branch over the release of Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) documents continues to have legal consequences. On April 10, 1986, the Attorney
General petitioned for the appointment of independent counsel (commonly
called a "special prosecutor") to investigate charges of wrongdoing by two Department of Justice officials and a deputy White House counsel in connection
with their handling of the interbranch dispute. See Justice Dept Is to Ask for
Independent Inquiry into E.P.A. Action, N.Y. Times, Apr. 11, 1986, at A17, col.
1. The Attorney General's preliminary investigation into the charges was
prompted by a four-volume House Judiciary Committee report detailing the
allegations. See generally H.R. REP. No. 435, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
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years-in particular, Anne Gorsuch's attempt to withhold Environmental Protection Agency documents and James Watt's
similar attempt in the Department of the Interior-are historically exceptional, but their infrequency does not belie their importance. First, executive privilege disputes are most likely to
occur over matters that involve especially significant subjects of
governmental decision making, or matters that are especially
sensitive politically, or both. Congress's ability to achieve access to information in such matters may well affect the substance of particularly important government decisions. It may
also set the tone for executive/congressional relationships in a
host of other contexts in which the relative political influence
of the branches is critical.
Second, the occasions for invocation of executive privilege
may well become more numerous over time because of developments in both the executive and legislative branches. On the
executive side, the bureaucracy directly reporting to the President has grown dramatically in the past few decades, 3 and that
bureaucracy has tried repeatedly to increase centralized control
over the rest of the administrative apparatus of the executive
branch. 4 As a result, there is growing policy deliberation at
levels close to the President that is potentially susceptible to
Correspondingly, the increasing
congressional oversight.
number and complexity of administrative tasks at the national
level have prompted a burgeoning of congressional staff and
3. Units of the Executive Office of the President created since 1960 include the Office of Federal Procurement Policy, the Office of Policy Development (formerly the Domestic Policy Staff), the Office of the United States
Trade Representative, the Council on Environmental Quality, the Office of
Science and Technology Policy, the Office of Administration and the Office of
Management and Budget (formerly the Bureau of the Budget). For a description of these recently created executive offices and their enabling acts, see
1986-1987 OFFICE OF THE FED. REG., U.S. GOV'T MANUAL 79-91 (1986).
4. A series of presidential executive orders centralizing oversight of the
administrative rulemaking process in the Office of Management and Budget illustrates this tendency. Exec. Order No. 12,498, 3 C.F.R. 323 (1985), reprinted
in 5 U.S.C. § 601 at 92-93 (Supp. III 1985) (Reagan); Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3
C.F.R. 127 (1982), reprintedin 5 U.S.C. § 601 at 431-34 (1982) (Reagan); Exec.
Order No. 12,044, 3 C.F.R. 152 (1979), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 553 at 70-72
(Supp. II 1978) (Carter); Exec. Order No. 11,821, 3 C.F.R. 926 (1971-1975), reprinted in 12 U.S.C. § 1904 at 766 (Supp. V 1975) (Ford). For discussions of the
constitutional and policy issues raised by the Reagan orders, see Rosenfield,
PresidentialPolicy Management of Agency Rules UnderReagan Order 12,498,
38 ADMIN. L. REv. 63 (1986) and sources therein at 89 n.151; Shane, Presidential Regulatory Oversight and the Separationof Powers: The Constitutionality
of Executive OrderNo. 12,291, 23 ARiz. L. REV. 1235 (1981).
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oversight.5 This growth, amid an increasing political atmosphere of "open government"6 that supports executive disclosure
of information, may result in more numerous occasions for the
invocation of the executive privilege.
One aspect of the recent confrontations that proved a particular impediment to their efficient resolution was the deep
disagreement between Congress and the Executive as to applicable legal principles. Not only did the two branches take divergent negotiating positions as to what they would accept"full disclosure to Congress" versus "no more disclosure than
the President wants"-but they also took radically opposed
legal positions, each branch insisting on its ultimate constitutional authority over disclosure of the information in question. 7
The negotiations became, therefore, largely a jockeying over
positions, with the legal opinions of each branch proffered to legitimate the negotiators' firnmess.8 Given the assumption of
each branch that only one branch could be constitutionally correct, each branch implied that only its position could be justi5. Recent estimates indicate that the number of congressional staff grew
from 7,091 in 1960 to 17,963 in 1984-an increase of over 250 percent-and the
number of subcommittee staff grew during the same period from 910 to
3,183-an increase of nearly 350 percent. Broder, Who Took the Fun Out of
Congress?, Wash. Post Nat'l Weekly Ed., Feb. 17, 1986, at 9, col. 1.
6. The Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 383
(1966) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982)), and the Government in
the Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976) (codified at 5 U.S.C.
§ 552b (1982)), which dramatically increased public access to written government records and to meetings of multiheaded government agencies, illustrate
the trend in recent decades toward an "open government" philosophy.
7. For example, compare the tenor of the executive position in an advisory opinion on the scope of the privilege in response to a congressional subpoena, 5 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 27 (1981) (opinion of Attorney General
William F. Smith) [hereinafter Att'y Gen.'s Watt Opinion], reprinted in Contempt of Congress:HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations [o)7 the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 1st and 2d
Sess. 104 (1981-1982) [hereinafter Watt Contempt Hearings] with the congressional attitute reflected in a memorandum from Stanley M. Brand, General
Counsel to the Clerk of the U.S. House of Representatives, to Hon. John
Dingell regarding the Attorney General's letter concerning a claim of executive privilege for Department of Interior documents [hereinafter House General Counsel's Watt Memorandum], reprinted in Watt Contempt Hearings,
supra, at 108-17.
8. In its four-volume study of the EPA imbroglio, the House Judiciary
Committee concluded that the desire to assert executive privilege in that instance arose not with the EPA, but with the Department of Justice. H.R. REP.
No. 435, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1985). This statement implies that the executive branch was motivated more by vindication of the executive privilege principle than it was by the practical necessity of confidentiality for the EPA
activities at issue.
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fied by law and on the basis of the public interest that
constitutional law is supposed to embody.
The purpose of this Article is to challenge that assumption,
that is, that only one branch can be "correct" on a matter of
separation of powers and, consequently, that interbranch dispute resolution should vindicate that one correct version of the
law. Rather, government officials should view the contending
legal positions of all three branches not as divergent attempts
to hypothesize the correct law for all settings, but as separate
attempts to crystallize each branch's independent understanding of the law. Each branch, then, has an independent doctrine
of executive privilege which is entitled to primacy within the
"jurisdiction" of that branch, but which deserves only coequal
status with the others in other contexts.9
In so arguing, this Article does not urge that the Constitution be regarded as not yielding any answer to the problems of
executive privilege. Nor should lawyers in each branch of government regard all conceivable views as equally valid. On the
contrary, this Article recommends that each branch's lawyers
assume a quasi-adjudicative role in determining for their respective branch the "one right answer" to any question of executive privilege. Having done so, however, they should also
respect the authority of the other branches to arrive at different answers to the same question and to acknowledge that circumstances may at times require that the other branches'
doctrines receive primacy.
Adopting this approach to executive privilege issues would
have two advantages for Congress and the Executive. First, it
would be conducive to a more judicious attitude toward constitutional interpretation generally within each political branch.
Second, it would lend itself to a new and more constructive approach to questions of presidential prerogative that arise in the
twilight zone of concurrent congressional and presidential
authority.
This Article's approach has been described as "problemsolving" negotiation.'" It seeks to make negotiating parties
9. The suggestion that each branch has independent authority to interpret the Constitution is not new. See, e.g., G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
22-24 (11th ed. 1985) (statements of Presidents Jefferson, Jackson, and Lincoln). What this Article adds to the debate is an attempt to trace systematically the implications of such authority for interbranch negotiation and the
resulting professional obligations of government lawyers.
10. Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation. The
Structure of ProblemSolving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754, 758 (1984).
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aware of their respective needs and objectives and to expand
the resources available for meeting the needs and objectives of
both parties. This strategy of negotiation would increase the
likelihood of appropriate settlements of executive privilege disputes between the President and Congress at less cost, in time
and institutional good will, than that of past disputes. This Article suggests that acceptance by each branch of the coequal respect due to the contending legal positions of the other
branches will facilitate this kind of bargaining in the negotiation context.
Part I of this Article offers an explanation of how separate
constitutional understandings within the government may
evolve and sketches the position of each branch on executive
privilege. Part II then considers the advantages for government
accountability of permitting each branch an independent doctrine of executive privilege. Part II's thesis is that the attitude
toward legal interpretation that this Article prefers will foster
more conscientious, responsible legal interpretation. Part III,
after discussing the recent Watt and Gorsuch cases, describes
the problem-solving approach to the negotiation of executive
privilege disputes and how such an approach might be advanced
by interbranch acceptance of the "multiplicity" of constitutional doctrine.
I.
A.

THE CONTENDING DOCTRINES OF
EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE

THE EVOLUTION OF LEGAL DISAGREEMENT GENERALLY

Despite its notable commitment to legal process, the government of the United States faces inherent difficulties in
achieving unitary, government-wide legal interpretation. The
very distribution of power among three coequal branches of
government means that each branch may evolve at least some
important understandings of the law that differ from those of
the other two branches. This is true even with respect to legal
issues, such as the scope of the presidential war powers, that
are of concern to more than one branch. In practice this means
that members of one branch of government, trying assiduously
to follow the law, may be following a legal theory substantially
different from the theories that members of the other branches
would feel obligated to follow if faced with the same legal
question.
The possible occasions for judicial legal interpretation that
may differ from interpretations by the other branches are con-
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spicuous and familiar. Any proper lawsuit against the United
States on a constitutional issue raises the possibility that a federal court may disagree with the constitutional views embodied
in the actions of another branch. Such disagreement is expressed in the form of a legal judgment.
Although less familiar, occasions for constitutional disagreement are potentially just as numerous between the political
branches. On a variety of important questions, Congress and
the President may entertain substantially different constitutional interpretations which may never be adjudicated in court
and, indeed, may never provoke any notable confrontation between the political branches themselves. For example, each
branch has some leeway to interpret the Constitution with respect to those of its own initiatives that do not require cooperation from the other political branch. Congress may decide not
1
to enact legislation that it presumes to be unconstitutional.
Such an action by Congress could never evoke a formal legal
response by the courts and need not evoke a legal opinion from
the executive branch because failed bills are not presented to
the executive for approval or veto. Similarly, the executive
branch may veto legislation because of its asserted unconstitutionality or may decline to propose legislation because of constitutional doubts. 12 Again, no judicial review of either sort of
decision exists and Congress may choose, even in response to a
veto, not to challenge the Executive's constitutional
understanding.
Further, even when the political branches are interdependent for the implementation of either branch's initiatives, their
legal views may never be reconciled because means of cooperation can be found that do not require their differences to be resolved. One obvious example is the political branches'
divergent legal assessments of the scope of the President's
11. Congress's repeated refusals to limit the Supreme Court's jurisdiction
to hear certain classes of constitutional cases exemplify this possibility. See G.
GUNTHER, supra note 9, at 47-48.
12. On July 10, 1832, President Jackson vetoed the bill to recharter the
Bank of the United States, asserting that
[i]t is as much the duty of the House of Representatives, of the Senate, and of the President to decide upon the constitutionality of any
bill or resolution which may be presented to them for passage or approval as it is of the supreme judges when it may be brought before
them for judicial decision.
Veto Message of Andrew Jackson on Bill to Recharter the Bank of the United
States, reprintedin G. GUNTHEPR, supra note 9, at 22-23.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:461

power, pursuant to his authority as commander in chief,13 to
engage American troops in military action abroad without a
congressional declaration of war. Congress and the executive
branch have articulated notably different understandings of
that power,' 4 but their disagreement has not produced any
practical impasse. 15 The war powers example is also instructive
because it reminds us that major legal disagreements between
the political branches can not always evoke a judicial settlement. The Supreme Court has never articulated a view on the
6
general scope of presidential war power.'
The absence of judicial precedent on this and other legal
questions dividing the political branches is not surprising.
Before a federal court will entertain a challenge to the legal position of one of the other branches, at least one branch must act
in a way that poses actual or imminent injury to a private party
so as to create article III standing in that party to pursue a suit
in court. Many disputes between the political branches may
arise without yielding such a plaintiff and substantial problems
exist in recognizing one political branch's "standing" to sue the
other.' 7 Additionally, even if a plaintiff with standing exists to
13. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
14. Compare Meeker, The Legality of United States Participationin the
Defense of Viet-Nam, 54 DEP'T ST. BULL. 474, 484 (1966) ("[The President's
commander-in-chief] duties carry . . . the power to deploy American forces
abroad and commit them to military operations when the President deems
such action necessary to maintain the security and defense of the United
States.") with War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1541(c) (1982) ("The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief to introduce United
States Armed Forces into hostilities ... are exercised only pursuant to (1) a
declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United States ....
).
15. A notable illustration involved President Reagan's use of Marines in
Lebanon. There, a political compromise obviated any need to reconcile the
branches' differing views on the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution. See Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (Supp.
III 1985) (effective Nov. 22, 1983).
16. The leading case-indeed, nearly the only relevant case-concerns the
status of President Lincoln's blockade of the southeastern coast of the United
States following a Confederate attack on Fort Sumter, a military action undertaken without a declaration of war. See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635
(1862). The Court held, by five-to-four vote, that the blockade constituted a
lawful act of war within the President's commander-in-chief duties and not
merely an exercise of his power faithfully to execute the statutory laws of the
United States in the face of domestic insurrection. This holding could be read
broadly to support the executive branch view, read narrowly to support Congress's view, or, one presumes, read still another way to support yet different
views that the Justices may hold, but have had no occasion to express.
17. See, e.g., Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 41 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J., dissenting) (disputing the existence of congressional standing to litigate disputes
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challenge the position of a branch in an interbranch dispute,
the courts may forbear adjudication because of the "political
question" doctrine.1 8 It is for this reason, in particular, that an
interbranch dispute on the scope of the President's war powers
is unlikely ever to provoke definitive judicial resolution.1 9
Thus, numerous occasions exist for the political branches
to interpret the Constitution differently from one another. In
addition, their respective interpretations may have significant
practical consequences within each branch. For example, the
President, given his view of presidential war powers, may
devote substantial effort to preparing military contingency
plans that Congress, if asked, would not sanction as solely presidential initiatives. Congress, thinking itself entitled to all executive branch information, may adopt rules for dealing with
sensitive information obtained from the executive branch that
in the executive
would be unnecessary were it to acquiesce
20
branch's control of all such information.
When divergences occur between the political branches on
matters of constitutional interpretation, it seems natural to regard them as disagreements on what is the one correct interpretation of the law. Both may have it wrong, but both cannot
have it right. This characterization of their differences of opinion, however, is not inevitable. For example, our legal system
permits different states to interpret tort law differently, even
under the same rubric of "negligence," unless and until Congress may decide to impose a uniform rule pursuant to its legislative powers. Different federal courts of appeals may interpret
federal constitutional or statutory law differently unless and
until the Supreme Court resolves the conflict. In short, there
are many important situations where we regard law-interpreting institutions as having authority to disagree on the meaning
of law, at least until another institution with perceived superseding jurisdiction to resolve the disagreement does so. The aubetween Congress and the President), vacated sub nom. Burke v. Barnes, 107
S. Ct. 734 (1987).
18. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (describing the circumstances in which the political question doctrine is properly invoked).
19. Cf. Mora v. McNamara, 389 U.S. 934 (1967) (Stewart and Douglas, JJ.,
dissenting) (urging the Court to squarely face important issues as to the President's war powers by granting certiorari in this case), denying cerL to 387 F.2d
862 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
20. For examples of such rules, see Senate Standing Rule XXIX(6), reprinted in S. Doc. No. 1, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 61 (1984); House of Representatives Rule XLVIII(7), reprintedin H.R. Doc. No. 271, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 692-

96 (1983).
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thority to interpret law independently extends to the
boundaries of that institution's "jurisdiction."
It therefore seems plausible to ask whether each of the
political branches may also have a jurisdiction within which it
is permitted to interpret the Constitution independently and
within which its particular interpretations are entitled to be regarded as law. This suggestion seems all the more plausible in
light of two easily overlooked points. First, however deep the
branches' legal disagreements, there may be important contexts
in which no branch has any functional interest in overturning
the other branches' legal views. That is, there is no pressing
need not to respect each branch's independent authority. For
example, even if Congress and the President disagree on the
scope of executive privilege, Congress has no reason to begrudge the President routine power to manage sensitive information within the executive branch as if the ultimate
responsibility for protecting the national interest in the secrecy
of such information is his. Conversely, the President can
hardly oppose congressional efforts to adopt rules for the protection of sensitive information in the hands of Congress, even
where such rules are formulated in part on the disputed assumption that Congress is routinely entitled to confidential information possessed by the Executive.
The second point is that, on matters that the judiciary has
not addressed, it may be difficult to determine in any principled
way which political branch's constitutional views are authoritative. Both legal positions may be colorable, even strongly so,
and their respective entitlements to authority-based on who is
articulating them-may be equal.
These observations prompt the hypothesis that it is possible to view the branches' legal interpretations not merely as
contending positions awaiting reconciliation, but as independent
doctrines. A particular branch's interpretation would be entitled to respect in some contexts, perhaps irrelevant in others,
and, in certain limited situations, in need of settlement by an
extraneous decision maker. Under this conception, even the
courts' version of the law would be but a competing doctrineone that informs the other branches, but is not always dispositive. Each branch's area of decision-making competence would
end only where the proper functioning of government compels
another branch to have primacy or where there is some other
compelling constitutional reason for regarding another branch
as authoritative. Before pursuing the consequences of such a
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conception in Parts II and III of this Article, it is worthwhile to
review the currently contending doctrines of executive privilege enunciated by each branch.

B. THREE THEORIES OF ExEcuTvE PRIVILEGE
1.

The Judicial Doctrine of Executive Privilege

The easiest of the three branches' doctrines to explicate is
the judicial doctrine of executive privilege. This is true for two
reasons. First, several commentators have already subjected
the judicial doctrine of executive privilege to searching and
helpful analyses. 2 1 Second, the conventions as to what constitutes law for the federal judiciary-namely, case decisions rendered within a known hierarchy of authority-are much more
firmly established than are the analogous conventions for determining the doctrines of the other two branches.
The Supreme Court has not adjudicated any executive
privilege dispute with Congress, and thus no one opinion exists
that purports to resolve definitively, from the judicial point of
view, the principled contentions that such disputes might involve. Several Supreme Court decisions strongly imply, however, what the Court's view would be on a number of these
contentions.
Of central importance is the 1974 opinion in United States
v. Nixon,22 which held that the President has a constitutionally
based, but defeasible, privilege to withhold information from a
court based on a generalized claim of presidential confidentiality.2 3 The Court identified as the constitutional basis for the
privilege "the supremacy of each branch within its own assigned area of constitutional duties, '24 and "the valid need for
protection of communications between high Government officials and those who advise and assist them in the performance
of their manifold duties. '25 The Court was untroubled that the
21. See, e.g., R. BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH
(1974) (including bibliography); Cox, Executive Privilege, 122 U. PA. L. REV.
1383 (1974); Freund, Foreword: On PresidentialPrivilege,88 HARV. L. REV. 13
(1974); Sofaer, Executive Privilege: An Historical Note, 75 COLUM. L. REV.
1318 (1975); Sofaer, Book Review, 88 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1974) (reviewing BERGER, supra). See also sources cited in F.I. GREENSTEIN, L. BERMAN & A.
FELZENBERG, EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN PRESIDENCY: A BIBLIOGRAPHICAL
SURVEY Nos. 143-152 (1977).
22. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
23. Id. at 712-13.
24. Id. at 705.
25. Id.
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Constitution makes no express provision for executive privi26
lege. Instead, citing the holding of McCulloch v. Maryland
with respect to the implied powers of Congress, the Court held
that a presumptive executive branch privilege of nondisclosure
could follow by analogous implication from those powers of the
27
President that are express.
In addition to concluding that a constitutional basis exists
for invoking executive privilege against courts, the Nixon opinion is significant for two reasons. The first is its holding that
the claim of privilege in that case was overcome by the institutional need of the trial court to have the information necessary
to secure "the fair administration of criminal justice." 28 Putting aside whether the Court's balancing in Nixon was entirely
persuasive,29 it is a central element of the Supreme Court's doctrine that a claim of executive privilege may be weighed against
the powers of the courts to perform their assigned constitutional tasks.
The other critical point from Nixon is the Court's implication that different claims of privilege may be accorded different
weights according to the bases of the claims. Thus, the Court
distinguishes at length the generalized interest in the protection of confidential presidential communications invoked in
Nixon from narrower claims of privilege based on military and
state secrets, as to which "the courts have traditionally shown
the utmost deference to Presidential responsibilities."3 0
The Court in Nixon expressly reserved any question concerning "the balance between the President's generalized interest in confidentiality . . . and congressional demands for
information. ' 31 It is thus not entirely certain whether the
Court would recognize any constitutionally based privilege
against Congress or, if it did, whether its balancing approach
would be the same. On the other hand, it is hard to imagine
that the Court would recognize a constitutionally based privilege of nondisclosure to the courts that would not also be relevant to a contest with Congress.
The Nixon case is consistent with the Court's modern bal26. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
27. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 705 & n.16.
28. Id. at 713.
29. The Court's analysis is forcefully questioned in Van Alstyne, A Political and ConstitutionalReview of United States v. Nixon, 22 UCLA L. REV.
116 (1974).
30. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 710.
31. Id. at 712 n.19.
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ancing approach to separation of powers problems that are not
squarely addressed by constitutional text. 32 A separation of
powers claim is recognized whenever the initiative of one
branch substantially interferes with the power of another to accomplish its constitutional tasks.33 In such a case, the initiative
must be justified by some overarching governmental interest.
Given this general approach, the Court would surely find those
executive branch responsibilities supporting the existence of
privilege in Nixon to be no less deserving of constitutional concern when the threat to the fulfillment of those executive duties emanates from an extrajudicial source such as Congress.
The two relevant court of appeals decisions on executive
privilege against Congress are consistent with this analysis.
Less than two months before Nixon, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in Senate Select
34
Committee on PresidentialCampaignActivities v. Nixon, upheld the district court's refusal to enforce a Senate committee
subpoena against Richard Nixon for the "original electronic
tapes" of five conversations between Nixon and John Dean. 35
The court of appeals recognized a presumptive executive privilege to protect the confidentiality of presidential communications 36 and, in the peculiar context of this case, held that the
presidential privilege outweighed the need for the subpoenaed
tapes by the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities. 37 The court stated that, because of a concurrent House Judiciary Committee investigation, the Senate
Committee's "oversight need for the subpoenaed tapes [was],
from a congressional perspective, merely cumulative. '38 The
Committee's need for the tapes in aid of its legislative function
was likewise limited because the Committee pointed "to no spe32. See, e.g., Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 442
(1977) (taking a "pragmatic, flexible" approach to separation of powers).
33. Id. at 443 ("I]n determining whether the [Presidential Recordings and
Materials Preservation] Act disrupts the proper balance between the coordinate branches, the proper inquiry focuses on the extent to which it prevents
the Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned
functions.").
34. 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en banc).
35. Id. at 733.
36. Id at 730.
37. Id. at 732.
38. Id. at 732. Copies of all the subpoenaed tapes had been delivered to
the House Committee on the Judiciary in connection with the Nixon impeachment inquiry, four of the five original tapes had been delivered to the district
court in connection with the Watergate prosecutions, and the President had already released partial transcripts of the tapes at issue. Id at 732-33.
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cific legislative decisions that [could not] responsibly be made
without access to materials uniquely contained in the tapes or
without resolution of the ambiguities that the [released] transcripts may contain. '39 This reasoning thus presaged the Nixon
Court's decision in both recognizing a presumptive, constitutionally based privilege in the President and in implying that
the privilege was defeasible.
Three years later, the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit followed an approach similar
to its earlier Senate Select Committee approach in monitoring
an interbranch executive privilege dispute in United States v.
AT&T. 40 The dispute arose when the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House Interstate and Foreign
Commerce Committee subpoenaed from AT&T documents pertaining to certain warrantless wiretapping that the United
States, with the assistance of AT&T, assertedly conducted for
national security reasons. The Department of Justice sued
AT&T to enjoin compliance with the subpoena on the ground
that public disclosure of the Attorney General's letters requesting foreign intelligence surveillance of particular targets would
harm the national security. The chair of the House subcommittee intervened, on behalf of the House, as the real party
4
defendant. 1
Rather than resolve the dispute on its merits, the court of
appeals remanded with a suggestion that the parties negotiate a
settlement under guidelines proposed by the court. 42 The Justice Department then offered to give the subcommittee expurgated copies of the backup memoranda upon which the
Attorney General based his decisions to authorize wiretaps in
lieu of the demanded documents. 43 Information identifying the
wiretap targets would be replaced by generic descriptions written by the Department." Negotiations broke down over a procedure for assuring the subcommittee of the accuracy of the
45
descriptions.
When the case returned to the court of appeals, the court
ordered a procedure approximating the Justice Department's
39. Id. at 733.
40. 551 F.2d 384 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
41.
(appeal
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 385; United States v. AT&T, 567 F.2d 121, 123 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
of 551 F.2d 384 after remand).
551 F.2d at 385.
567 F.2d at 124-25.
Id. at 124.
Id.
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final offer.46 It based its order essentially on three premises.
First, the court divined a constitutional requirement of interbranch compromise: "[E]ach branch should take cognizance of
an implicit constitutional mandate to seek optimal accommodation through a realistic evaluation of the needs of the conflicting branches in the particular fact situation."4 7 Second, a court
has power to balance the competing interests of President and
48
Congress in a properly presented separation of powers case.
Third, in proffering a settlement to Congress, the executive
branch is entitled to respect for both its institutional interests
and for its presumptive good faith, but Congress is likewise entitled to continuing judicial vigilance to assure that its oversight
49
interests are fully protected.
Supreme Court precedent relevant to interbranch privilege
disputes also includes cases upholding Congress's general investigative powers. Just as the Court in Nixon, without textual
support, recognized a constitutionally implied executive power
to resist disclosure of presidential communications, the Court,
without textual support, has recognized a constitutionally implied congressional power of investigation. The leading case,
McGrain v. Daugherty,50 arose from a Senate investigation into
alleged corruption in the Justice Department under former Attorney General Harry M. Daugherty. The Court overturned a
lower court order that had discharged Daugherty's brother
from his obligation to testify before a Senate select committee
investigating the alleged abuses. 5 1
In upholding the committee's subpoena, the Court made
two critical determinations. The first was that "the power of
inquiry-with process to enforce it-is an essential and appro46. Id at 131-32. The Justice Department, relaxing its position, had offered to permit the Subcommittee to inspect 10 randomly selected unexpurgated memoranda for purposes of verification, as well as all expurgated
memoranda, for the two sample years. Id. at 130-31.
47. Id. at 127.
48. Id. at 126-28.
49. Cf. id at 131 n.34 (indicating that a small sample of 10 documents,
although not large enough to be statistically representative of the whole, was
large enough to meet the congressional objective of "deter[ring] high officials,
in whom special trust and confidence have been reposed, from any tendency to
manipulate or deceive"). Thus, under the court of appeals procedure, the district court would mediate, by in camera inspection and further remedial action, subsequent issues of accuracy and fairness, subject to appellate review.
Id at 131-32.
50. 273 U.S. 135 (1927).
51. Id at 137, 182.
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priate auxiliary to the legislative function" 52 and is, therefore,
implicitly vested in Congress by the Constitution. The second
was that, although this power exists only in aid of the legislative function, Congress need not have before it a specific legislative proposal in order for its authority to be triggered. No
such specific proposal existed in McGrain. It was sufficient
that the Court could conclude from the face of the subpoena:
"Plainly the subject was one on which legislation could be had
and would be materially aided by the information which the in53
vestigation was calculated to elicit."
The crux of the judicial doctrine of interbranch executive
privilege disputes thus appears to be as follows: Congress has a
constitutionally based power to demand information pursuant
to investigations in aid of its legislative and oversight functions.
The President, on the other hand, has a constitutionally based
privilege to withhold disclosure of information, the release of
which would impede the performance of executive branch responsibilities. A presumptive claim of privilege may be asserted to protect even the President's generalized interest in
confidential deliberations. Executive privilege, however, is defeasible, and a claim of privilege based on a generalized interest
in confidentiality may carry less force than narrower claims
based on military and state secrets.
Before concluding, one institutional point is worth noting.
The congressional and executive branch doctrines of executive
privilege that follow may well appear self-serving. Therefore,
one feature of the judicial doctrine that makes it attractive is
its appearance of institutional disinterest. The judicial doctrine
of executive privilege is, however, tacitly as responsive to the
institutional interests of the courts as are the contending doctrines of the other branches to their respective interests. It is
true that the Court recognizes a presumptive claim of executive
privilege, even against a court, but the judiciary purports to remain the ultimate arbiter of that privilege. The Court's legitimation of the constitutional powers of Congress and President
to demand and withhold information, respectively, does not undermine the Court's self-declared power to balance the interests of competing branches. Indeed, the appearance of judicial
self-restraint in the D.C. Circuit cases in second-guessing presidential claims of privilege is unsurprising from a political point
of view because the courts have nothing to gain and much to
52. Id. at 174.
53. Id. at 177.
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lose from a more confrontational stance. The D.C. Circuit's exhortation to reasoned compromise is perfectly consistent with a
judicial recognition that the courts cannot profit from risking
putatively final resolutions of interbranch impasses that directly involve neither individual rights nor the powers of the
courts.
This is not to say that the judicial version of the law is entirely suspect because of its consistency with the courts' institutional self-interest. Indeed, there are oft-cited explanations
why judicial indulgence of institutional interest is a less threatening phenomenon than self-serving initiatives by the political
branches. i In considering whether to prefer an attitude towards legal interpretation that gives unquestioning primacy to
the judiciary's interpretive role, however, we should not permit
the relative subtlety of the courts' political interests to blind us
to their doctrinal impact.
2.

The Congressional Doctrine of Executive Privilege

Congress's legal understanding of executive privilege is
more difficult to divine than that of the courts because relevant
statutes address the issue only obliquely and because, other
than statutes, conventional formats for expressing congressional legal opinion are not well established.5 5 Congress does
make law predominantly by enacting statutes and it is arguable
that Congress can formulate a legal doctrine only by positively
legislating.56 Under that premise, congressional "law" respect54.

See, e.g., Karst & Horowitz, PresidentialPrerogativeand JudicialRe-

view, 22 UCLA L. REv. 47, 56 (1974) (arguing that courts are better suited to
the articulation and development of constitutional principle than are the political departments because they examine constitutional values in light of concrete situations, they are free from active policy making, and "they normally
satisfy the hope that the umpire 'is not practically, even though he may be theoretically, deciding his own case' ").
55. It could be argued that any search for constitutional interpretation by
Congress is especially misguided because of doubts as to Congress's institutional capacity to engage in constitutional interpretation meaningfully. See
Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitution?, 61
N.C.L. REV. 587 (1983). For a thoughtful defense of Congress in this respect,
see Fisher, ConstitutionalInterpretationBy Members of Congress, 63 N.C.L.
REV. 707 (1985). On the duty of lawmakers to interpret the Constitution, see
Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guidc to ConstitutionalInterpretation,
27 STAN. L. REV. 585 (1975).
56. Cf. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952
(1983) (invalidating one-House "legislative vetoes" because such vetoes are essentially legislative in purpose and effect and are subject to the bicameral and
presentment requirements of article I, § 7).
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ing executive privilege would exist only to the extent that Congress has enacted a statute addressing the problem.
Congress does, however, make law other than by legislating. This is clear with respect to its internal procedures, where
rules and precedents that it establishes are followed although
not statutorily embodied. 57 Congress may also make law
through custom, which the Supreme Court has recognized in
treating custom as a source of decisional authority in separation
of powers cases. 58
It is not a novel idea, of course, that a political authority
can establish legal norms without formal legislative action. The
very concept of international law is largely dependent on the
possibility of creating law without positive enactments by formal lawmaking bodies. Under one jurisprudential theory,
norms arise from assertedly authoritative statements of policy
by nations or by international agencies that are capable of enforcing those statements. 59
The insight that norm prescription can occur without posi57. See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
58. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981) (upholding
executive orders issued to settle dispute provoked by Iranian seizure of U.S.
embassy which provided for suspension of private litigation against Iran in the
United States, in part because of the "history of [congressional] acquiescence
in executive claims settlement."); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (concluding that traditional ways of conducting government supply meaning to the Constitution or
legislation); United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 472-473 (1915) (upholding presidential reservation of public oil lands from private development,
notwithstanding apparently contrary statutory prohibition, in part because
Congress's past acquiescence to similar orders implied its authorization for the
reservation); see generally Glennon, The Use of Custom in Resolving Separation of Powers Disputes, 64 B.U.L. REv. 109 (1984).
59. This statement tries to encapsulate, without the daunting terminology,
the helpful methodology originated by Professors Myres McDougal and
Michael Reisman for norm identification in international law which they describe as the "coordinate communication flow" theory. McDougal & Reisman,
The PrescribingFunction in World Constitutive Process: How International
Law is Made, 6 YALE STUD. WORLD PuB. ORD. 249, 250-54 (1980). In their
view, a prescriptive communication or legal norm conveys "policy content, [an]
authority signal and [a] control intention." Reisman, InternationalLawmaking: A Process of Communication, 75 AM. SOC. INT'L L. PROC. 101, 108 (1981).
Policy content is, of course, the rule or command asserted by the statement in
question. Id. The "authority signal" is a statement to the intended audience of
the legal communication that the norm-prescribing agency is the appropriate
lawmaker. Id. at 110. The "control intention" is "a credible communication
that those who are prescribing intend to and can make ... controlling" the
norms they prescribe. Id. at 111. For an illustrative application of the approach in a problematic context, see Weston, Nuclear Weapons Versus InternationalLaw: A Contextual Reassessmen 28 MCGILL L.J. 542 (1983).
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tive legal enactment is critically helpful in interpreting Congress's informal law respecting executive privilege and
Congress. Two episodes involving James Watt and Anne Gorsuch,60 for example, resulted in statements about the law by
counsel to the clerk of the House that contained explicit policy
content, were intended to be understood as authoritative, and
conveyed an implicit communication of Congress's capacity to
enforce its views vis-a-vis the executive branch. 61 Their attractiveness as documents for helping to elaborate Congress's doctrine of interbranch executive privilege is enhanced by the
readiness with which they can be reconciled with the prevailing
interpretation of the most relevant statutes and a satisfactory
62
"reading" of congressional custom.
With that background, the broad outlines of a congressional doctrine of executive privilege are fairly clear and unsurprising. First, Congress asserts its plenary authority to demand
executive branch information in connection with any properly
authorized legislative oversight hearing. For example, the
Freedom of Information Act,63 which exempts large categories
of executive branch records from mandatory public disclosure,
expressly disclaims the application of those exemptions to con60. See infra notes 117-88 and accompanying text.
61. See House General Counsel's Watt Memorandum, supra note 7, reprinted in Watt Contempt Hearings, supra note 7, at 108-17; Memorandum
from Stanley M. Brand, General Counsel to the Clerk, U.S. House of Representatives, to Elliot H. Levitas, Regarding Attorney General's Letter Concerning Subpoena for Documents to Administrator of Environmental Protection
Agency (Dec. 8, 1982) [hereinafter House General Counsel's Gorsuch Memorandum], reprinted in CONTEMPT OF CONGRESS: REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE
ON PUBLIC WORKS AND TRANSPORTATION ON THE CONGRESSIONAL PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ANNE M. GORSUCH, ADMINISTRATOR, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, FOR WITHHOLDING SUBPOENAED DOCUMENTS RELATING TO
THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND LIABIL-

iTY ACT OF 1980, H.R. REP. No. 968, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. app. 58 (1982) [hereinafter GORSUCH REPORT].

62. What is most problematic in treating the opinions of congressional
counsel as sources of law is, of course, that their claimed authoritativeness
would be vigorously disputed by their executive branch audience. It is problematic whether the counsel to the clerk is viewed as an authoritative
lawmaker even within Congress. We need not resolve this jurisprudential
problem here, however, because our immediate aim is only to elaborate what
Congress would regard as the law of interbranch executive privilege if it could
assume the validity of its own assertion of authority. Recent legal opinions are
consistent with statements made by members of Congress over a long history
and with the tenor of the most relevant statutory enactments, suggesting that
these opinions satisfactorily embody the legal position of Congress.
63.

5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982).
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gressional demands for information, 64 including the exemption
generally recognized as protecting documents deemed to be
protected by executive privilege. 65 The opinions of counsel assert additionally that no information generated at a staff level
is properly subject to any executive privilege whatsoever. 66 Finally, there is no limitation on the subject matter of information that Congress properly may demand; even information
international negotiarelating to foreign relations, including
67
tions, is within Congress's purview.
This is not to say that Congress denies the importance of
withholding certain executive branch information from the
public; rather, it denies the executive branch's authority to regard dissemination to Congress as public disclosure. Congress
does regard itself as bound to provide for the nondisclosure of
information, the dissemination of which would compromise national security.68 Such responsibility may obligate a congressional subcommittee, for example, to respect a good faith
executive branch demand that it receive sensitive information
only in "executive session." 69 The authority to disclose information that a committee receives in executive session, however,
would reside in the committee, never in the executive branch.
This rendition of Congress's doctrine vis-a-vis executive
privilege may appear at odds with the various occasions on
which subcommittees have acceded to executive insistence on
nondisclosure.7 0 It does not appear from the history of such in64. Id. § 552(c).

65. See id. § 552(b)(5); see also NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S.
132, 150 (1975) ("That Congress had the Government's executive privilege specifically in mind in adopting Exemption 5 is clear ....).
66. House General Counsel's Watt Memorandum, supra note 7, reprinted
in Watt Contempt Hearings,supra note 7, at 109.
67. Id., reprinted in Watt Contempt Hearings, supra note 7, at 116-17;
House General Counsel's Gorsuch Memorandum, supra note 61, reprintedin
GORSUCH REPORT, supra note 61, app. at 62-63.
68. House General Counsel's Gorsuch Memorandum, supra note 61, reprinted in GORSUCH REPORT, supra note 61, app. at 62-63.
69. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
70. See generally Memorandum from Theodore B. Olson, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, for the Attorney General, Regarding the
History of Presidential Invocations of Executive Privilege Vis-a-Vis Congress
(Dec. 14, 1982), reprintedin GORSUCH REPORT, supra note 61, at 90, discussing
past and present administrations' refusals to disclose; Memorandum from Theodore B. Olson, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, for the
Attorney General, Regarding Refusals by Executive Branch Officials to Provide Information or Documents Demanded by Congress (Jan. 27, 1983) (unpublished supplement to memorandum of Dec. 14, 1982, supra); STAFF OF
SUBCOMM. ON SEPARATION OF POWERS OF THE COMM. OF THE JUDICIARY, 93D
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stances, however, that any such occasion represents an unambiguous concession to the authority of the executive branch to
withhold. Even Congress's insistence that it is empowered in
every instance to demand and receive executive branch information would not require Congress to stand on its asserted authority at every opportunity. 7 ' It can only be said with
confidence that there are many instances in which Congress's
calculation of its own interests, its confidence in the President,
and the asserted interests of the executive branch permit Congress to accommodate the executive branch, whatever its view
of underlying principle.7 2
3.

The Executive Doctrine of Executive Privilege

As with the legislative branch, discerning the executive
branch doctrine of executive privilege provokes the jurisprudential difficulties of determining the constitutional law of a
branch of government that does not engage in formal constitutional adjudication. These problems are largely relieved, however, by the constitutional vesting of executive power in a
single officer, the President. Unlike a congressional counsel,
committee or subcommittee, whose authority may be questionable even within Congress, the President unmistakably holds
the final authority within the executive branch, even as to the
law. On occasions on which the President does not personally
express his views, the executive legal doctrine may be espoused
by the Attorney General, who is by law and tradition the chief
CONG., 2D SESS., REFUSALS BY THE ExEc. BRANCH TO PROVIDE INFORMATION
TO THE CONGRESS 1964-1973: A SURVEY OF INSTANCES IN WHICH ExEC. AGENCIES OF THE GOVERNMENT HAVE WITHHELD INFORMATION FROM MEMBERS AND
COM.'S OF THE CONGRESS AND FROM THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE U.S.

(Comm. Print 1974).
71. It is likewise true that the executive branch's willingness to submit information that might have been protected under a privilege claim to Congress
does not gainsay the executive branch's asserted authority to claim privilege.
The difficulty that is posed for Congress when it acquiesces in an executive
branch insistence on secrecy, or for the executive branch when it acquiesces in
a congressional demand for information, is justifying nonacquiescence in other
instances depending on their facts. Thus, one House Judiciary Committee criticism of the executive branch's handling of the EPA dispute discussed below is
that the executive branch failed to explain how the information it sought to
withhold differed from earlier EPA information that had been voluntarily released. H.R. REP. No. 435, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 28-31 (1985).
72. See, e.g., Sofaer, Executive Privilege: An HistoricalNote, 75 COLUM. L.
REV. 1318, 1321 (1975) (Congressional acquiescence may signify that Congress
is willing to trust the President in some instances.).
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legal representative of the executive branch. 73 It is executive
branch practice that, unless contravened by legal developments,
typically Supreme Court opinions, which have greater status as
law, opinions of the Attorney General are to be regarded as
binding the executive branch in legal interpretation. In sum,
there are relatively few voices to be consulted within the executive branch to determine its legal position, and the intrabranch authoritativeness of those voices is clear under law
and custom.
For the last eighteen years at least, presidential documents
have explicitly embodied an executive branch doctrine of executive privilege. On March 24, 1969, President Nixon issued a
general memorandum to the heads of executive departments
and agencies concerning congressional demands for information.74 The Ford and Carter Administrations left this policy intact, and a 1982 redraft by President Reagan 75 left untouched
the core principle of that memorandum. That principle is that
the executive branch "has an obligation to protect the confidentiality of some communications," but will invoke executive
privilege against Congress only with "specific Presidential authorization," in the "most compelling circumstances," and "only
after careful review demonstrates that assertion of the privilege
76
is necessary."
The scope of the President's authority to withhold de73. The Attorney General's opinions
officially define the law, in a multitude of cases, where his decision is
in practice final and conclusive,-not only as respects the action of
public officers in administrative matters .... but also in questions of
private right, inasmuch as parties, having concerns with the Government, possess in general no means of bringing a controverted matter
before the courts of law ....
6 Op. Att'y Gen. 326, 334 (1854); 28 U.S.C. § 521 (1982).
74. Memorandum from President Nixon for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, Establishing a Procedure to Govern Compliance with
Congressional Demands for Information (Mar. 24, 1969), reprinted in Executive Privilege-Secrecyin Government: Hearings on S. 2170, S. 2378, S. 2420
Before the Subcomm. on IntergovernmentalRelations of the Senate Comm. on
Gov't Operations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 207 (1975).
75. See Memorandum from President Ronald Reagan for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, on Procedures Governing Responses to
Congressional Requests for Information (Nov. 4, 1982) [hereinafter Reagan
Memorandum], reprintedin REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY OF
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON INVESTIGATION OF THE ROLE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE IN THE WITHHOLDING OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY DOCUMENTS FROM CONGRESS IN 1982-83, H.R. REP. No. 435, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1106 (1985) [hereinafter DEP'T OF JUSTICE INVESTIGATION].

76.

Id.

1987]

EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE

manded information extends, under the executive view, to all
information the disclosure of which would impede the responsible discharge of executive branch functions.7 7 Under the Reagan memorandum, such information may include "national
security secrets, deliberative communications that form a part
of the decision-making process, or other information important
to the discharge of the Executive Branch's constitutional responsibilities."78 The last category is likely to cover the contents of investigative files assembled for law enforcement
purposes, information that would disclose the identity of a government informer, or confidential, personal information about
executive branch personnel.7 9 The Reagan memorandum could
be used to protect such material even if it emanates originally
from staff levels considerably removed from the President. In
such a case, however, a claim of privilege would require presidential familiarity with and review of the materials.8 0
Because the executive branch regards the protection of
confidential information as necessary to protect the integrity of
executive power generally, it cannot discharge that responsibility by divulging information to Congress under a promise that
Congress will act responsibly in deciding whether to further
disseminate the information. Such a delegation of control over
information would be, in the executive view, an unconstitutional abdication of power 81 analogous to an unconstitutionally
overbroad congressional delegation of legislative authority in a
standardless statute.8 2 Further, as attorneys general have recognized, this principled position obviates the unseemly spectacle of having the executive branch purport to decide which
83
congressional committees are trustworthy and which are not.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See Letter from Attorney General William French Smith to Hon.
John D. Dingell (Nov. 30, 1982) [hereinafter Att'y Gen.'s Gorsuch Letter], reprintedin GORSUCH REPORT, supra note 61, at app. 37.
80. See Reagan Memorandum, supra note 75, reprinted in DEP'T OF JUSTICE INVESTIGATION, supra note 75, at 1106-07.
81. Att'y Gen.'s Gorsuch Letter, supra note 79, reprintedin GORSUCH REPORT, supra note 61, app. at 39 ("IThe President has a responsibility vested in
him by the Constitution to protect the confidentiality of certain documents
which he cannot delegate to the Legislative Branch.").
82. See, e.g., Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541-42
(1935) (Congress's attempt to authorize President to approve codes of fair competition under the National Industrial Recovery Act held an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power because it gave the President virtually unfettered discretion).
83. Att'y Gen.'s Gorsuch Letter, supra note 79, reprintedin GORSUCH RE-
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A final aspect of the executive branch doctrine deserving of
mention is the customary concession that the President will not
invoke executive privilege to withhold information probative of
official wrongdoing in the executive branch.8 4 Prior to the
Nixon impeachment investigation, Presidents had repeatedly
stated that the House had the right to demand executive
branch evidence in connection with such inquiries. Nixon's refusal to honor Judiciary Committee subpoenas duces tecum
was, therefore, reported by that Committee as an article of
85
impeachment.
II.

LEGAL DISAGREEMENT IN A GOVERNMENT
OF LAWS

The legal disagreement just described demonstrates that
lawyers in each branch of government are likely to approach an
executive privilege issue based on premises not shared by the
other two branches. How should government lawyers respond
to this fact, consistent with responsible representation of their
respective client branches? In the recent executive privilege
disputes, the apparent attitude of the lawyers was that one
branch was right and the other was wrong, one branch was authoritative and the other branch was usurpatious. This attitude
did nothing to discipline either side's tendency to assert its position in the most extreme fashion. This Part of this Article suggests that government lawyers facing separation of powers
issues instead should adopt the view that each branch, within
its particular jurisdiction, is entitled to interpret the Constitution for itself. Such an attitude would be conducive to more responsible intrabranch legal advice on any separation of powers
question.
As a backdrop to this conclusion, Section A of this Part
will discuss the relationship of legal reasoning to the "government of laws" ideal, with its emphasis on accountability and the
constraint of individual whim in the processes of governance.
Section A also notes the vital importance of the separation of
powers doctrine in achieving that accountability and constraint.
Section B of this Part then argues that the proposal that govPORT, supra note 61, app. at 39 (citing a 1941 letter from then-Attorney Gen-

eral Robert Jackson to Hon. Carl Vinson: "Unfortunately,... a policy cannot
be made anew because of personal confidence of the Attorney General in the
integrity and good faith of a particular committee chairman.").
84. Id., reprintedin GORSUCH REPORT, supra note 61, app. at 41.
85. H.R. REP. No. 1305, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1974).
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ernment officials regard each branch's views on the separation
of powers as "law" for that branch promotes conscientious legal
interpretation and thus contributes to the government of laws
ideal. Part III of this Article argues finally that the proposal
would also facilitate more constructive interbranch negotiations.

A. LEGAL INTERPRETATION AND THE GOVERNMENT
OF LAWS IDEAL

The ideal of a "government of laws" has long embodied a
popular concept of the kind of government we want, and it is a
natural ideal to guide the development of a model for appropriate government lawyering. Supreme Court opinions invoke the
government of laws ideal to help justify decisions.86 Public officials routinely invoke the government of laws ideal to explain
their approval or disapproval of a wide range of government
conduct. It is a reasonable prediction that, as long as judges
and legal scholars continue to employ explicitly normative reasoning in the discussion of constitutional problems, the government of laws ideal will be a recurring premise in such
discussions.
It is likewise reasonable to assume that the government of
laws concept expresses a central aspiration for our constitutional system, widely shared by government official and citizen
alike. Every past and present government official could likely
offer some anecdotal support for the hypothesis that this aspiration makes a difference in official behavior. It would be surprising if the record were otherwise.
The government of laws ideal plays an important role in
our legal and political culture for another reason as well. Judicial opinions and political rhetoric invoke it to assert that a government of laws is not merely what we want, but, in important
respects, what we have. In Marbury v. Madison,8 7 Chief Justice John Marshall's clear implication was that the "appellation" of a government of laws actually describes the
86. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting) ("In a government of laws, existence of the government will be
imperilled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously."); Sparf v. United States,
156 U.S. 51, 102-03 (1895) (government of laws protects society and individuals
by requiring that juries apply the law given to them by the court to the facts
as they find them). A WESTLAW search for references in Supreme Court
opinions to the government of laws ideal discovered 34 relevant references
since 1926.
87. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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government of the United States.8 8 Therefore, a government of
laws is not simply an ideal to attain, it is a currently existing
state of affairs to be cherished. A prevailing sense that the government of the United States was not acting as a government of
laws would leave us feeling not only that we had fallen short of
our ideal, but also that we had lost some virtue already
achieved.
The concept of an ideal government of laws raises the question: To what sort of government does the phrase refer?
Although the concept is highly general, all references to a "government of laws, and not of people" evoke at least some image
of government actors guided by more than mere whim and calculation of how much whim they may indulge with impunity.
It follows, therefore, that a government of laws evidences some
sort of constraint on the official pursuit of individual desire.
To achieve this sort of accountability, it is not enough to regard a government of laws as merely a rule-bound government,
or a government in which similar rules apply to citizen and official alike. In a 1955 address celebrating the two-hundredth anniversary of John Marshall's birth, Justice Frankfurter spoke
eloquently of the need to conceptualize a government of laws
more broadly than as a government of rules:
Law is not set above the government. It defines its orbit. But government is not law except insofar as law infuses government. This is not
wordplaying. Also indispensable to government is ample scope for individual insight and imaginative orgination [sic] by those entrusted
with the public interest. If society is not to remain stagnant, there is
need of action beyond uniformities found recurring in instances which
sustain a generalization and demand its application. But law is not a
code of fettering restraints, a litany of prohibitions and permissions.
It is an enveloping and permeating habituation of behavior, reflecting
the counsels of reason on the part of those entrusted with power in
reconciling the pressures of conflicting interests. Once we conceive
"the rule of law" as embracing the whole range of presuppositions on
which government is conducted..., the relevant question is not, has it
been achieved, but, is it conscientiously and systematically pursued.8 9

Justice Frankfurter suggests, instead of a mere government of rules, a government characterized by "an enveloping
88. Id. at 163 ("The government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to
deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of
a vested legal right.").
89. Frankfurter, Address: John Marshall and the Judicial Function, in
GOVERNMENT UNDER LAw 28 (A. Sutherland ed. 1956).
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and permeating habituation of behavior, reflecting the counsels
of reason."90 How does this habituation occur? The answer
that would likely occur most readily to anyone who has worked
in government is that it occurs through the commitment of government actors to legal compliance and, therefore, to legal interpretation as an important mode of justification for official
behavior. A government of laws is a government in which law
provides not only rules, but also a set of reference points such
as a constitution, statutes, and judicial decisions, as well as customary methods of interpretation by which officials habitually
describe, justify, and thus normatively understand their governmental acts.9 1
Although this conception may sound highly abstract, it is
actually something basic and familiar. The starting point for its
comprehension is the observation that an individual's actions
have no meaning without some set of reference points and interpretive methods by which those actions are understood.
Consider the example of one person opening a door for a stranger when the two arrive at its threshold more or less simultaneously. What is the door-opener doing? Avoiding a collision?
Calculating to instill a sense of indebtedness in the stranger?
Getting exercise? Conventionally, both actors involved interpret the door-opening as a "courtesy," an interpretation they
manifest by a smiling nod on one side and a "Thanks" on the
other. In this case, cultural convention gives the act meaning.
Even without conversation, both actors share a conception of
what is transpiring and why.
One set of familiar reference points by which we interpret
our acts is legal. To take a mundane, albeit much discussed example, consider the act of a driver stopping at a red light despite a moral certainty that no police officer is near and that
"running the light" poses no danger. What is the person doing?
Resting from a hard drive? Delaying her inevitable arrival at
some dreaded destination? Most of us, including the driver,
would probably say that she is simply obeying the law. The primary meaning the driver attaches to the light is that of a legal
requirement to stop. The impetus for actually stopping is a
90. Id.; cf Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term Foreword: Nomos and
Narrative,97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4-5 (1983) ("Once understood in the context of
the narratives that give it meaning, law becomes not merely a system of rules
to be observed, but a world in which we live.").
91. For a discussion of conventionally recognized "legal" reference points
and methods of interpretation, see generally S. BURTON, INTRODUCTION TO
LAW AND LEGAL REASONING (1985).
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sense of obligation evoked by that meaning. If a passerby were
to criticize the driver for wasting time or for blocking the view,
such criticisms, even if valid, would not likely overcome this
sense of obligation.
It is worth noting, in this context, that the law does not
seem any the less significant to us in this example because the
driver, in fact, may have wanted to stop for other reasons. The
driver may attach other, more egocentric meanings to the red
light, including, for example, the opportunity it provides to sit
and gaze at a beautiful sunset. That the red light might produce some, perhaps even considerable, stopping if there were
no relevant law does not diminish our understanding that the
stop is importantly an act of legal obligation.
The "government of laws" conception mentioned above
suggests that, like drivers who stop at red lights, government
actors should habitually understand their official behavior as
acts of legal obligation. In deciding what it is appropriate to do
in their official capacities, they should consider the applicable
legal reference points in determining right and wrong, suitable
and unsuitable. They should do so even when the moral certainty exists that no formal sanction will punish inattention to
the applicable reference points. Conversely, they should regard
legal justification as an important factor even when other, more
egocentric, justifications would prompt the same behavior.
Thus, for example, a Justice Department paralegal trying
to decide the appropriate time in which to respond to requests
for information under the Freedom of Information Act should
consider himself bound by the statutory ten-day limit.92

He

should feel this even if no one would punish him, or even complain, if he dallied an extra day. Conversely, citizens may justly
regard consistent compliance with the ten-day limit as evidence
of a government of laws at work. The fact that a particular
paralegal is motivated by a desire to please his superiors or to
complete a tedious task in the least possible time does not
change this assessment; as observers, citizens perceive that they
are witnessing compliance with a sense of legal obligation and
they consider this fact important.
This conception of a government of laws, like a rule-based
conception of accountability, obviously does not exhaust the
concepts of accountability, justice, or order in society. That officials feel compelled to obey law and thus justify their acts in
92.

See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A) (1982).
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legal terms guarantees none of these institutional virtues.
Laws themselves may be unjust. The processes of legal interpretation may be sloppy, superficial, or corrupt. Yet, if officials
do feel compelled to interpret their actions in legal terms, even
in cases in which no sanction threatens the failure to do so, that
internalized compulsion is likely to be a significant protection
against arbitrariness for several reasons. These reasons suggest
that a government of laws is likely to be less arbitrary than a
government in which members assess their behavior solely by
the measures of politics or, indeed, of moral philosophy.
One reason that an official's internalized compulsion to
obey existing law helps prevent arbitrariness is that, like some
other typical sources of norms, legal norms reflect social values
embodying more than individual desire. Thus, a requirement of
justification through law is likely to turn the official's attention
to the contemplation of interests of persons other than herself
who will be affected by her official acts. It is a familiar experience to perceive a problem and possible courses of conduct differently when one looks at them from an institutional, rather
than from a personal, perspective. Recourse to legal justification encourages such a shift in perception.
A second reason for potential reduction in arbitrary administration of law through allegiance to legal norms is that legal
norms, unlike other norms, are typically derived from
processes that most, if not all, members of society regard as appropriate. Some emanate from legislatures whose susceptibility
to electoral pressure renders their actions legitimate. Others
emanate from courts through processes of adjudication that are
widely perceived as generating what society accepts as suitable
long-term principles for human conduct. Among the reasons
for acceptance of norms emanating from judicial processes are
the judicial necessity of confronting actual persons and their
problems in the determination of law, the public's expectation
that legal results will be defended in signed opinions that are
expected to serve as good precedent in a range of disputes, and
the luxury judges frequently have to give weight to long-term
social values, which more immediate political disputes often
submerge.
In sum, the compulsion to justify official acts legally turns
the official's contemplation away from unadorned self-interest
to prescriptive norms that are likely to contribute to order and
justice and are derived through processes widely perceived as
legitimate. It does so without denigrating the value of individ-
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ual wisdom and responsibility in the implementation of public
93
policy.
That our government of laws is a government of separated
powers also reinforces the vitality of law's constraint on individual whim. The distribution of different powers among the
branches, with the inevitability of some confrontation, makes
unavoidable some occasions on which one branch can poignantly remind another of the importance of pursuing justification through legal reasoning.
Justice Marshall's opinion in Marbury v. Madison 94 can be
read from just such a perspective. In statements that were
technically dicta, Marshall constitutionalized the traditional
distinction in the law of mandamus between judicially reviewable ministerial acts and unreviewable political acts for which a
government officer is not accountable in court. 95 He did so in
the face of his undoubted awareness that presidential exercises
of political discretion could result in constitutional violations
which the courts, under Marbury, could not remedy. For example, it would presumably be unconstitutional for the President, with purely invidious motives, to veto those congressional
enactments, and only those enactments, that had the effect of
improving the social position of American Blacks. Yet, following Marshall's reasoning, no judicial sanction could enjoin such
behavior. Indeed, no judicial sanction could compel Congress to
override the President's vetoes, or to impeach him for his
behavior.
Despite the potential for unjust results created by situations such as this, Marshall, without apparent irony, describes
our government as a "government of laws" in which the "laws"
93. This view is not intended to be read as too sanguine. Many suspect
that lawyers can rationalize any behavior and are typically happy to do so. In
any case where the political impetus for a course of conduct is profound, it is
easy to doubt the capacity of legal rhetoric to curb short-term self-interest.
Still, law is not considered unimportant in other contexts simply because it is
sometimes disobeyed or, conversely, because the desirable behavior it evokes
might have been prompted by other motivations in any event. It is striking
how much time and expense is devoted by our government to the pursuit of
legal justification for official behavior, often in contexts where no formal sanctions for extralegal or unlawful behavior exists. As examples, one can look to
the thousands of legal memoranda that exist in the files of general counsels to
each government agency, the opinions of the Attorneys General, the volumes
of legal opinions recently published by the Office of Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice, and the processes of computerization intended to make all
of this material more readily available as precedent.
94. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
95. Id. at 166.
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9
furnish a remedy for the violation of a "vested legal right." If
' 97
in Marshall's words, were inter"laws furnish[ing a] remedy,
preted simply to mean "courts furnishing mandatory relief,"
Marshall's characterization of our government as a government
of laws would be wrong. 98
It is possible, however, to interpret Marbury in a different
light. Each branch of the government has a role in maintaining
the ideal of the government of laws. The judicial branch, as
Marbury illustrates, is not solely responsible for providing remedies for unconstitutional behavior. Prospectively, the allegiance of the executive branch to legal norms affords a kind of
preliminary injunction against such behavior. That same sense
of obligation may lead Congress, in the face of necessity, to vest
jurisdiction in an appropriate court to review the Executive's
acts. Failing that, an obligation to impeach may arise. Such
remedies may not be perfect. As in Marbury's case, they may
fail. They do, however, exist, and Marbury may be read as an
exhortation to their use. 99
A government of laws, under this conception, is a government in which officials feel obligated to look to legal points of
reference to describe and justify official behavior. This obligation is treated as important, even if not always performed well
and even if, because law and political interest may coincide, it is
sometimes superfluous. It is deemed important that government officials at least exercise the self-discipline of questioning

96. Id at 163.
97. I&
98. Marbury itself would belie the "government of laws" claim because
Marbury could not obtain judicial relief, despite Marshall's determination that
Marbury had been denied his vested right in his commission. Marshall held
the grant of mandamus jurisdiction to the Supreme Court unconstitutional.
Id at 175-76. No other federal court had original jurisdication in a mandamus
proceeding as of 1803. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73. State courts
could not constitutionally issue mandamus against federal officers. M'Clung v.
Silliman, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 598, 604 (1821).
99. Jefferson might have deduced this point from the discretion Marshall
conspicuously exercised in choosing his rationale for decision and their shared,
tacit recognition that the Court might exercise its discretion more forcefully
against the President should more dire circumstances so require in the future.
One conscientious response to Marbury might well have been not to deliver
Marbury's commission-because Jefferson, as a matter of law, disclaimed any
such obligation-but to execute and deliver a new commission to demonstrate
Jefferson's intention to avoid even the appearance of injustice. Jefferson, in
fact, did commission most of the justices of the peace appointed by Adams,
whose commissions were not delivered. C.G. HAINES, THE ROLE OF THE
SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS, 1789-1835, at 246

(1944).
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the legal significance of their acts and, often, of providing explicit justification for those acts in legal terms. It is the habitual commitment to this interpretive regime that perhaps most
pervasively differentiates a government of laws from a government of unadorned power.
B.

CONSCIENTIOUS LEGAL INTERPRETATION AND THE

AUTHORITY TO INTERPRET LAW INDEPENDENTLY

The kind of attitude toward constitutional interpretation
evidenced by both branches' lawyers in recent executive privilege confrontations does not maximize the potential for conscientious legal reasoning on which a government of laws relies.
The patently adversarial cast to their opinions 00 signified the
premises underlying that attitude. First, it was assumed that
only one "right" answer existed to legal issues in dispute. Further, because the answer might ultimately be sought from a
court, the political branches' lawyers might legitimately articulate their respective positions as zealous advocates might prepare their briefs.
In keeping with the suggestion that a contrary view is possible-that each branch may evolve a legal interpretation which
may govern within that branch's jurisdiction and which is entitled to respect from the other branches-an alternative attitude
for government lawyers is likewise available to animate their
legal reasoning. Government lawyers may determine separation of powers law in a manner akin in most respects to the
method followed by federal courts of appeals for legal interpretation generally. That is, each branch should regard as its law
those legal conclusions that appear most sound according to
conventionally accepted interpretive methods applied independently by that branch. 10 1
100. See infra notes 117-88 and accompanying text.
101. This analogy to the courts of appeals is inexact chiefly with respect to
the role that Supreme Court opinions should play in the political branches'
legal interpretations. Like the courts of appeals, the political branches know
that the great majority of their opinions will not be reviewed by the Supreme
Court. There is thus some leeway afforded the courts and, by analogy, the
political branches in construing Supreme Court opinions in that not all legal
"creativity" below will be second-guessed from above. Both the courts
of appeals and the political branches must recognize, however, that some possibility
of review does exist and, thus, their opinions must be written to some extent
with the aim of appearing acceptable to the Supreme Court. The imperfection
in the analogy is that, for the lower courts, acceptability of their judgments by
the Supreme Court might be viewed as a matter of routine hierarchical duty.
The Supreme Court is a superior judicial authority to whom they are organiza-
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Political branches should advert to the judicial method for
determining law because achieving a government of laws requires government lawyers to attend "judiciously" to the forms
and rhetoric of legal reasoning, and lawyers will be most habituated to the counsels of reason if they regard themselves as
playing a quasi-adjudicative role in the elaboration of law. This
suggestion may appear odd because, in many contexts, we assume that the law is best served by lawyers playing adversarial
roles. The adversarial role may seem natural for political
branches in inevitable competition. The obvious problem with
the adversary model for the political branches' lawyers, however, is its assumption that the adversaries are regularly and legitimately accountable to dispassionate and disinterested thirdparty review. In separation of powers disputes, such thirdparty review is almost always a distant prospect and, equally
1°2
important, its legitimacy is far less clear to the disputants.
Formal sanction and the persuasion of extraneous authority are
thus such distant normative considerations to the actors involved that the adversary model becomes an insufficient behavioral prescription for dealing with politically charged areas
where the practical scope of official discretion is great. What is
needed is a different attitude that better tempers the salutary
antagonism of the branches with the public interest in workable, responsible government.
The Constitution builds into each branch's relationship to
the others a necessary tension. On one hand, the branches' interrelationships have competitive aspects, which to some extent
would obviously be legitimated by recognizing as law each political branch's independent assertion of legal interpretation. In
the abstract, this competition is beneficial because it fulfills
what the founding generation foresaw as an important check on
the power of each branch. 0 3 Assuming that each branch's executive privilege doctrine will be most attentive to the institutionally bound. The political branches, however, are not subordinate to the judiciary; they are coequal with it. They may regard themselves, for important
reasons, as reviewable by the courts in particular cases, but this may well have
more to do with preserving a workable system by respecting a proper jurisdiction for judicial primacy than it does with a sense of obligation to the judiciary
per se.
102. Cf.discussion supra note 101.
103. In the fifty-first Federalist paper, Madison argued that a proper distribution of governmental power could be maintained only "by so contriving the
interior structure of the government as that its several constituent parts may,
by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper
places." THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 320 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
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tional needs of that branch, that fact is going to be healthy for
government.
On the other hand, the competition among the branches
must be sufficiently restrained to ensure a government that is
workable and responsible. The branches must attune themselves to long-term, as well as short-term, institutional interests. It is toward this end that a government of laws most
compellingly signifies a government in which officials experience "an enveloping and permeating habituation of behavior,
reflecting the counsels of reason.' 10 4 It is a government in
which officials are habitually committed to understanding the
normative significance of their acts in legal terms.
Official understanding, explanation, and justification of
government conduct is likely to be most responsible, and thus
most consistent with government workability, if the officials involved regard themselves as making, not just following, constitutional law. The legal opinions of Congress or of the
Department of Justice are likely to be more responsible over
time if each regards itself in the role of adjudicator rather than
advocate, because such an attitude is more conducive to a conscientious balancing of conflicting, legally relevant interests. 0 5
This proposition reflects common experience among lawyers. Any executive branch lawyer asked to explain the constitutional scope of executive discretion to withhold documents
from Congress is going to be attentive to at least two sets of
considerations: first, the institutional interests of the executive
branch in the disclosure or nondisclosure of information; second, the arsenal of interpretive methods which lawyers use to
reason as to the meaning of the Constitution. If such a lawyer
believes her opinion must be defensible as an authoritative exposition of law, it is a plausible hope that professional pride and
personal integrity will coincide to produce a legal opinion faithful to the claims of both sound legal reasoning and client interest. If the lawyer regards her opinion as only a "brief" for the
executive branch side of the argument, intuition suggests that
104. Frankfurter, supra note 89, at 28; see supra note 89 and accompanying
text.
105. Cf. James Bradley Thayer's argument that judicial review threatens to
undermine Congress's sense of moral responsibility for constitutional interpretation because "the correction of legislative mistakes comes from the outside,"
and resort to the courts "dwarf[s] the political capacity of the people." J.B.
THAYER, JOHN MARSHALL 103-04, 105-08 (1901), quoted in A. BICKEL, THE
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS
21-22 (1962).
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the lawyer's personal psychology will tolerate a greater indulgence of client self-interest at the expense of disinterested judgment. The difference will be one of degree, to be sure, but a
difference that may be important to the habituation of government lawyers to the "counsels of reason.'

0 6

One's willingness to accept this conclusion may be influenced by a qualitative assessment of the executive privilege
doctrines that Congress and the executive branch have actually
evolved. Except by fiat, it is difficult to choose between them
07
when they are stated at the level of generality offered above.
There is little textual support for either; there is some historical, normative, and judicial support for both. As to authorita106. It is uncertain whether the experience and recruitment pattern of
lawyers likely to be involved in executive privilege disputes will have any predictable impact on their reasonableness in particular cases. Law professor and
political scientist Donald L. Horowitz has argued that Department of Justice
litigators-by virtue of both their experience and pattern of recruitment, and
the organizationally separate, cross-agency structure of the litigation bureaucracy-are likely to be more attuned to judicial values and operating norms
than are lawyers from federal program agencies. See generally D.L.
HoRoWrTz, THE JUROCRACY (1977). He argues that, as might be expected, such
a group of lawyers is relatively more motivated by arguments of legal principle
and long-term governmental interest, and less by arguments of parochial or
short-term policy than agency lawyers committed to the program objectives of
their particular agencies. See, for example, i&i at 129 ("The Justice Department is responsible for 'the broad picture'; its mission is 'to develop in court
this unified approach.' ").
This insight might have important implications in the executive privilege
context because Professor Horowitz's portrait of the attitude orientation of
Justice Department lawyers in litigationis likely to apply a fortiori to the attitudes of Department of Justice lawyers who counsel the President or handle
interbranch negotiations. The lawyers most likely to be involved in such matters are located in the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), a small office charged
with overseeing the Department's counseling function on important legal issues. That office is even further removed from the responsibilities of specific
program administration and less likely to have allegiance to any one program
or policy initiative than the litigators Horowitz studied. Its recruitment pattern is more elitist, and its professional experience includes a fair amount of
quasi-adjudicative settlement of interagency disputes within the executive
branch of difficult legal questions, the resolution of which typically invites the
OLC to adopt adjudicative norms of detachment and generalization. Its elite
status is highlighted by its unusual physical proximity to the Office of the Attorney General. It does not automatically follow, however, that because OLC
lawyers are more likely than agency lawyers to be attuned to judicial operating norms that they will invariably analyze well any particular claim of executive privilege.
Although their judiciousness may temper
agency
overenthusiasm for secrecy, the OLC lawyers' relative detachment from
agency programs may lead them to undervalue agency arguments for disclosure to Congress when OLC lawyers perceive broader issues of principle to be
at stake.
107. See supra notes 55-85 and accompanying text.
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tiveness, each of these coequal branches has a colorable claim.
Thus, under conventional criteria for identifying law, both doctrines are plausible candidates.
History further demonstrates that, in the main, both
branches have acted responsibly pursuant to their doctrines.
The integrity of their respective legal commitments is additionally evidenced by the obligations each doctrine imposes on its
originating branch. 0 8 The executive branch, having claimed
power to determine unilaterally the disclosability of certain information, faces both the significant administrative burden of
managing sensitive information within the executive branch as
well as the political risks attendant on demanding secrecy in an
open society. Congress, claiming plenary power to demand information, likewise invites political risk and obligates itself to
discipline those members who compromise information that
should be withheld from the general public.
It is predictable that, if animated by a judicious rather than
adversarial attitude, neither of the political branches' contending doctrines of executive privilege, despite their utility to the
originating branch, would be shaped entirely by short-term concern for partisan interest. 0 9 Each doctrine must be formed
under the pressure of the two branches' practical interdependence. Each must be formed with reference to the same kinds
of interpretive methods that characterize the legal culture generally, and each will attempt to draw on the same kinds of
materials, including judicial opinions, for support. Thus, even if
permitting each branch to treat its own doctrine as authoritative yields only incremental benefits in the quality of official
behavior, the coequal status of the branches and the degree of
accountability evident in each branch's version of the law
108. It is important to the plausibility of regarding each branch's view of
executive privilege doctrine as intrabranch "law" that each branch's view
carry with it certain clear implications for that branch's internal management
of sensitive information. Although executive privilege is invoked within the
government only in interbranch disputes, executive privilege law thus has intrabranch relevance as well. "[A] legal interpretation cannot be valid if no one
is prepared to live by it....
The transformation of interpretation into legal
meaning begins when someone accepts the demands of interpretation and,
through the personal act of commitment, affirms the position taken.... Creation of legal meaning entails ... subjective commitment to an objectified understanding of a demand." Cover, supra note 90, at 44-45.
109. For the elaboration of a thoughtful model under which Congress's behavior in general (including congressional/executive interactions) is understood as the pursuit of a vision of the public interest rooted in public
discussion and deliberation, see generally A. MAASS, CONGRESS AND THE COMMON GOOD (1983).
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strengthen the case that those benefits can be achieved at little
cost.
Arguably, the inevitable attempt of the two political
branches to root their respective doctrines in judicial precedent
shows that it makes no difference to official behavior in separation of powers disputes whether the political branches regard
themselves as each making constitutional law, or the courts are
regarded as pronouncing constitutional law and the political
branches as following it. In the executive privilege area, the
District of Columbia Circuit's version of the law expressly contemplates a core of constitutional prerogative for both branches
and an obligation for each branch to accommodate to the maximum the other branch's legitimate interests. 1 0 Whether each
branch perceives itself as striving for a negotiated resolution of
the dispute under its own version of the law, or as following the
court's legal command to accommodate the legitimate interests
of the other branch within the judiciary's interpretation of law,
however, makes a difference.
The reason for this difference is threefold. Of course, it
must be recognized that the substantive outcomes of particular
disputes may differ only in degree, if at all, depending on the
attitude each branch takes towards the question of what is law.
If each branch, however, considers itself as having the authority to determine the proper scope of disclosure of sensitive information, each branch is more likely in a dispute to have
assessed and to have explicated its institutional needs thoroughly and in a way that will focus accountability on that
branch more readily should its demands for or handling of information appear unjustifiable in light of those professed needs.
Second, the attitude toward legal interpretation that this
Article recommends should instill in each branch a respect for
the other branches' coequal autonomy in the performance of its
functions and in the maintenance of checks and balances.
Thus, disputants should be led to look at disagreements not as
occasions for one legal view to prevail over the other, but as occasions for accommodating more concrete short-term interests
of the contending branches.'" In other words, disputants
should not regard the fact of legal disagreement as signaling
that one branch is "right" and the other "wrong" nor should
they focus negotiation on vindicating "the right position." Such
a shift in attitude would, in turn, reduce the inclination of
110.
111.

See supra notes 34-49 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 208-33 and accompanying text.
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either side to adopt extreme legal positions as a matter of political strategy.
Finally, even if specific results in executive privilege disputes do not change, the habituation of lawyers of both
branches to thinking, in separation of powers disputes generally, that they are interpreters of the Constitution, not just advocates, may lead to the formulation of normative positions by
both branches that can be touted more responsibly as law to
the courts and to the public. That is because the two branches'
jurisprudential attitudes towards executive privilege law may
affect more broadly their reasoning and behavior in other important separation of powers contexts.
It should also be stressed that the "judicious" stance towards legal interpretation need not undermine any advantages
normally associated with the beliefs that judicial doctrine is always the law of the Constitution, no matter what the context,
and that the political branches should regard themselves as
constrained to follow judicial interpretation.
The more traditional approach to legal interpretation
serves the government of laws ideal in two ways. First, it preserves the notion of a unitary law, allegiance to which may deter arbitrary judgment by government officials. Second, it
preserves the authority of courts, which have historically been
thought the safest monitors of the boundaries of each branch's
powers.1 12 Calculating the prospect of eventual reliance on the
courts to enforce the branches' respective views of executive
privilege might be a helpful behavioral constraint on legislative
and executive officials otherwise tempted to allow short-term
partisan interests to dominate decision making.
It is not necessary to give automatic primacy to judicial
doctrine, however, to assure a law that is workable in the sense
that there appears to each government official a reasonably ascertainable set of answers to legal questions on which the official may rely in order to avoid merely idiosyncratic conduct.
The recognized primacy of the executive or of legislative doctrine would still preserve the unity of the law. Indeed, even if
there were three "laws" of executive privilege-executive, congressional, and judicial-the law would appear coherent to the
actors within each branch. All follow their respective branch's
doctrines, subject to the occasional demand in particular cases
112. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961)
("In unfolding the defects of the existing Confederation, the utility and necessity of a federal judicature have been clearly pointed out.").
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of accommodating the dictates of one branch's doctrine to the
legal claims of another branch.
Further, judicial doctrine need not be given primacy in all
contexts to preserve judicial authority. Judicial authority in
matters of constitutional interpretation is ordinarily regarded
as most important in two contexts in which actions of the federal government are challenged. 113 The first involves cases concerning the preservation of individual rights, where the
meaningful implementation of an antimajoritarian constitutional provision may depend on its defense by an institution relatively insulated from direct majoritarian pressure. 114 The
second involves the resolution of impasses reached by the other
two branches, which defy orderly resolution without judicial intervention115 In these categories of cases, in which the political
branches may find themselves in court, it is important that
each be willing and able to put its case in terms that respect the
court's authority because these categories establish the functionally proper jurisdiction within which judicial views should
prevail.
Many separation of powers disputes, however, neither implicate individual rights directly, nor do they portend eventual
impasse. The political branches, in interpreting the War Powers Resolution, for example, may have strongly contending positions but also strong incentive to reach accommodation.
Individual rights may not be implicated at all in the usual
sense, and the branches' disagreement will never require thirdparty review. There is no need, in such a situation, for the
political branches internally to give great weight to the views of
courts in order to assure proper deference in other cases where
113. This, of course, puts to one side the functionally critical role of the
Court, irrelevant here, in providing for the uniform interpretation of federal
law among state courts. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304,
331 (1816).
114. See A. BICKEL, supra note 105, at 23-28.
115. In concurring with the Supreme Court's decision to vacate with a direction to dismiss the lower court's judgment in Goldwater v. Carter, a case
challenging President Carter's abrogation of the mutual defense treaty between the United States and Taiwan, Justice Powell surmised:
If this case were ripe for judicial review ....none of these prudential
considerations would be present.... The specter of the Federal Government brought to a halt because of the mutual intransigence of the
President and the Congress would require this Court to provide a resolution pursuant to our duty to "'to say what the law is.'"
Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1000-01 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring) (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974), quoting Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
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the political branches recognize that judicial intervention is
important.
Some will view this argument as astonishingly naive. It
rests on the premises that legal interpretation in an interbranch dispute can be something other than posturing and that
the reasoning of lawyers actually affects the resolution of political disputes. Under the traditional view, only courts pronounce law; the elucidation of law by the political branches on
separation of powers questions should be viewed only as part of
an implementation process that is almost entirely political in
two senses. First, it is primarily partisan. Second, it is attuned
only to policy, not principle. What lawyers say, according to
this version of reality, is no real evidence of the quality of interbranch interaction; the real action is largely behind the scenes,
ad hoc, and entirely instrumental.
To ignore the political dimensions of separation of powers
disputes or to try to characterize those disputes in purely legalistic terms would surely blink reality. An unrelievedly partisan
account of government is, however, equally overdrawn and unpersuasive, especially without much more comprehensive evidence than is available on the actual resolution of interbranch
disputes. My response to the cynical account is in part experiential because my perceptions of my own service in the Department of Justice lend subjective credibility to a more idealistic
version of the reality of government, a version in which legal
reasoning does matter.116 In equal part, however, I am wary of
the cynical account and committed to the argument I have advanced because the Constitution seems so strikingly to envision
a government under a government of laws ideal. If it is true
not only that law is a form of politics, but that law for Congress
and for the President is only politics in the narrowest and most
116. The author of this Article was an OLC attorney-adviser from 1978
through 1981. Larry A. Hammond, who was Deputy Assistant Attorney General in charge of OLC during most of this period, has written:
In many instances ....
Jimmy Carter was not interested in playing
the "lawmaker as advocate" game ....
Carter made it known, very
clearly, that if there was a legal question in a policy paper, he wanted
to know whether the options were lawful or not lawful.... He knew
that lawyers could "advocate" any position, but he wanted his Attorney General to tell him what the correct legal answer was, and he was
prepared to live by it.
Letter from Larry A. Hammond to Peter M. Shane (Jan. 7, 1986). Cf. generally A. MAASS, supra note 109 (discussing congressional structure and proposing that "access by Congress to information that the Executive wishes to
withhold should be decided according to the relationship of the disputed information to the duties of each of the two branches," id. at 251).
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partisan sense, a great part of our professed constitutionalism is

an illusion and much government lawyering is merely an expensive fraud upon the public.
III. PROBLEM-SOLVING NEGOTIATION, LEGAL
DISAGREEMENT, AND EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
The preceding Part of this Article argued that if government officials regarded each branch's views on the separation
of powers as "law" for that branch-that is, as authoritative
within the branch's jurisdiction-that attitude would help promote conscientious legal interpretation. The question remains
whether such an attitude would be helpful or unproductive in
the actual resolution of interbranch disputes. If each branch is
entitled to follow its own doctrine as the law, the branches' insistence on principle might forestall efficient settlement of disputes more than if the branches regarded themselves as jointly
accountable to an outside agency, such as the judicial branch.
Recent experience, however, suggests the opposite.
Namely, the branches tend more to intransigent "positional"
bargaining if their attitude is that only one correct version of
executive privilege law exists and each branch's position is the
articulation of that law. Bargaining would be more productive
if the branches believed that each branch had the authority to
make law within its jurisdiction and that the aim of negotiation
is not to settle on one legal view as binding on both parties.
The branches should perceive themselves as negotiating an immediate, concrete problem. What government needs is a theory
of negotiation that steers officials, while actually bargaining,
away from the vindication of doctrinal principle and toward the
reconciliation of institutional interests.
Section B of this Part shows how the political branches
could more successfully negotiate executive privilege disputes
by employing a strategy that accepts the legitimacy of the
branches' legal disagreement. To make that strategy fully comprehensible, however, Section A first describes what is publicly
known about what actually occurred during the intense executive privilege disputes of the first Reagan Administration.
A.

CASE HISTORIES OF INTERBRANCH EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
DISPUTES

1.

James Watt: Executive Privilege and Foreign Policy
In early 1982, then-Secretary of the Interior James Watt
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barely averted the distinction of becoming the first cabinet officer in history to be held in contempt by a house of Congress.
During the previous summer, the Oversight and Investigations
Subcommittee of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce requested from Watt's department all documents, including documents at the staff level, 11 7 relevant to the status of
Canada under the so-called reciprocity provisions of the Mineral Lands Leasing Act (MLLA).11 8 Watt indicated, in August
6, 1981 testimony before the subcommittee, that the Department was unlikely to divulge all of the relevant documents because some were confidential. 19 Just over seven months later,
following full committee approval of a resolution to hold Watt
in contempt of the House, the White House permitted subcommittee members to review the last of the documents that Interior had originally identified as responsive to the subcommittee
120
demand.
The general subject of the subcommittee's inquiry was the
impact of Canadian energy and investment policies on United
States energy resource companies holding assets in Canada.
The hearings were prompted by allegations that the Canadian
government was trying, through its policies, to devalue the assets of these companies unfairly and to provoke takeover attempts by Canadian interests. 121 Among the possible
retaliatory steps available to the United States would have been
invocation of the MLLA reciprocity provisions, 122 which permit
foreign citizens to hold interests in mineral leases on United
States public lands only if their countries provide equivalent
opportunities for United States investors. Under the MLLA,
Congress vested in the Secretary of the Interior the authority
to determine whether foreign countries are providing reciprocal
treatment for U.S. mineral investors. By the summer of 1981,
Secretary Watt had not yet made a decision as to Canada. Because of the possibility that a decision adverse to Canada might
help protect United States investment interests, the committee's attention had turned to oversight of Watt's decision-making process.
The chronology of give-and-take between the branches
from August 1981 through March 1982 resembles, in its essen117. Watt Contempt Hearings,supra note 7, at 3.
118. 30 U.S.C. § 181 (1982).
119. Watt Contempt Hearings,supra note 7, at 3.
120. Id. at 385.
121. See H.R. REP. No. 898, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1982).
122. 30 U.S.C. § 181 (1982).
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tials, all recent major executive privilege disputes between the
President and Congress. 123 The subcommittee's informal demand in early August 1981 elicited a turnover of roughly 200
documents on September 24, 1981, accompanied by a letter
from Watt's legislative counsel asserting that executive privilege might be invoked to protect various documents not disclosed. On September 28, the subcommittee voted to subpoena
the remaining documents and the subpoena was served, after
further negotiation, on October 2. Watt responded by releasing
an additional thirty-two documents following what he characterized as an "interagency review" of their contents. On October 13, 1981, President Reagan formally asserted executive
privilege as to the final thirty-one documents. 124 Secretary
Watt reported the President's decision in testimony to the subcommittee on October 14, 1981. At that time, Watt also asserted that the executive branch had proffered unsuccessfully
"other means to familiarize the subcommittee with the conof providing actual
tents of these papers without the necessity
5
copies of the documents themselves.'
In refusing Congress's request for all the documents, Secretary Watt relied on a formal opinion rendered to the President
by the Attorney General upholding the President's claim of
privilege. 126 The reasoning of the Attorney General's brief
opinion was straightforward. It was grounded on three premises. First, the executive branch is constitutionally entitled to
protect "quintessentially deliberative, predecisional" documents. 12 7 Second, although Congress has legitimate interests in
obtaining executive branch information, its interests in information "for oversight purposes [are] . . . considerably weaker
than its interest when specific legislative proposals are in question." 128 Third, "the congressional oversight interest will support a demand for predecisional, deliberative documents in the
possession of the Executive Branch only in the most unusual
circumstances."'1 2 9 From these premises, it followed that the
documents withheld could be withheld because they all were
123. See H.R.

REP. No. 898, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-8 (1982).
124. Watt Contempt Hearings, supra note 7, at 68 (President Reagan's
Memorandum of October 13, 1981 for the Secretary of the Interior Regarding
Congressional Subpoena for Executive Branch Documents).
125. Id. at 67.
126. Att'y Gen.'s Watt Opinion, supra note 7, at 27, reprinted in Watt Contempt Hearings,supra note 7, at 104.
127. Id. at 29, reprinted in Watt Contempt Hearings, supra note 7, at 105.
128. Id. at 30, reprinted in Watt Contempt Hearings,supra note 7, at 106.
129. Id., reprintedin Watt Contempt Hearings, supra note 7, at 107.
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"either necessary and fundamental to the deliberative process
presently ongoing in the Executive Branch or related to sensitive foreign policy considerations." 3 0 The Attorney General
concluded, "The process by which the President makes executive decisions and conducts foreign policy would be irreparably
impaired by the production of these documents at this time."13 1
In the ensuing months, a subplot developed as the subcommittee tried unsuccessfully to elicit the personal appearance of
Attorney General William French Smith to defend his opinion.
The printed hearings relating to the eventual resolution of contempt include a detailed rebuttal of the Smith opinion by thenGeneral Counsel to the Clerk of the House, Stanley Brand,1 3 2
and an exchange of testy letters between Subcommittee Chair
John Dingell and the Department of Justice concerning the
possibility of Smith's testifying. 133
The Brand letter forcefully questioned all of the Attorney
General's assertions concerning the limited investigative powers of Congress. Brand argued that, to the extent executive
privilege exists, those documents that were generated at the
staff level in a cabinet department could never be protected by
it.134 According to Brand, Congress did not interfere with any

executive power in demanding such documents, and its authority to seek such information in performing its oversight function is at least as great as Congress's investigative powers in
connection with legislative deliberation. 135
With negotiations over the documents proceeding, the subcommittee held hearings in November 1981 on the subject of
executive privilege generally and on the Attorney General's
opinion.136 Neither the hearings nor the continuing negotiations resolved the dispute. On February 2, 1982, without having
met the subcommittee's disclosure demands, Secretary Watt announced that he had reached a decision on Canadian reciprocity
favorable to Canada. 3 7 The next day, on February 3, Watt
turned over nineteen of the thirty-one contested documents on
130.
131.

Id. at 28, reprinted in Watt Contempt Hearings,supra note 7, at 105.
Id. at 32, reprinted in Watt Contempt Hearings,supra note 7, at 108.

132. House General Counsel's Watt Memorandum, supra note 7, reprinted
in Watt Contempt Hearings,supra note 7, at 108-17.
133. Watt Contempt Hearings,supra note 7, at 260-66.
134. House General Counsel's Watt Memorandum, supra note 7, reprinted
in Watt Contempt Hearings,supra note 7, at 109.
135. Id., reprintedin Watt Contempt Hearings,supra note 7, at 111-15.
136. See Watt Contempt Hearings,supra note 7, at 133-281.
137. Id. at 318.
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the ground that his reaching a final decision obviated further
nondisclosure. 138 Six days later, the subcommittee's Democratic majority, joined by its ranking Republican member, voted
to hold Watt in contempt and to report its resolution to the full
Energy and Commerce Committee.1 39
With total compliance still not forthcoming, the full committee, on February 25, 1982, likewise voted to recommend that
the House cite Watt for contempt. 140 This final committee action, and the virtual certainty of its approval by the full House,
finally elicited settlement on the eve of the House vote. The
White House agreed to permit subcommittee members four
hours to review and to take notes on the remaining twelve documents. The documents would be reviewed on Capitol Hill, but
would remain within the custody of the executive branch. No
the documents and no photocopystaff personnel could review
141
ing would be permitted.
The immediate interests of both branches in the Watt imbroglio are superficially clear. The subcommittee wanted full
access to information that might shed light on the usefulness of
the MLLA reciprocity process to deal with the alleged problem
of unfair Canadian policy and to consider the need to amend
the MLLA or to take retaliatory measures. The executive
branch insisted that nondisclosure was essential to the integrity
of its deliberative processes and foreign policymaking generally.
Presumably, once Secretary Watt reached his final decision, the
executive branch's interest in reaching that decision without
distortions wrought by premature disclosure of internal deliberations was eliminated. The executive branch would retain,
however, a generalized interest in protecting its deliberations
necessary to the successful conand in maintaining confidences
1 42
duct of foreign relations.
From a broader perspective, it is manifest that both
branches perceived the Watt dispute in a wider legal and political context. Representative Dingell, the subcommittee chair,
was also Chair of the full Committee on Energy and Commerce. From his vantage point, Watt's refusal to comply with
the request for MLLA documents likely appeared part of a
larger pattern of noncooperation between Watt and Congress
138. H.R. REP. No. 898, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1982).
139. See Watt Contempt Hearings,supra note 7, at 295-96.
140. Id. at 368-70.
141. Id. at 385-86.
142. See Att'y Gen.'s Watt Opinion, supra note 7, at 29, reprintedin Watt
Contempt Hearings,supra note 7, at 105.
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over confidential information. 14 3 On the executive branch side,
the Attorney General's vigorous defense of executive privilege
occurred against the backdrop of a broader effort led by the Department of Justice to buttress executive branch control over
the dissemination of information generated within the executive branch. 4 4 Smith's opinion is notable, for example, for the
breadth with which it attempts to establish a presumptive right
of the executive branch to withhold deliberative documents
from congressional committees.-4 5
It may be that the Administration was destined, because of
the size of the Democratic majority in the House, to lose this
143. See H.R. REP. No. 898, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. at 66-70 (1982) (statement
of Reps. Moffett, Ottinger, Scheuer, Waxnan and Markey).
144. For example, see Attorney General Smith's revocation of former Attorney General Griffin Bell's restrictive policy concerning the circumstances
under which the Justice Department would defend agencies' nondisclosure of
records under the Freedom of Information Act, Wash. Post, May 5, 1981, at
All, col. 1, and the issuance of a national security directive strengthening the
nondisclosure obligations of certain persons with access to classified information and subjecting such employees to possible polygraph examinations in connection with investigations of leaks, National Security Decision Directive 84:
Hearingon S. 568 Before the Senate Comm. on Governmental 4ff., 98th Cong.,
1st Sess. 85-86 (1983).
145. See supra notes 126-31 & 142 and accompanying text. Personality factors also may have aggravated the dispute. Secretary Watt was widely believed to be a zealot for Reagan Administration policy; Representative Dingell
is widely perceived to be among Congress's most powerful and aggressive
members. Cf., e.g., Peterson, Now It's Greetinggate: EPA Strikes Back with a
'Dingellgram'of Its Own, Wash. Post Nat'l Weekly Ed., Feb. 10, 1986, at 14,
col. 1 (referring to the "dreaded 'Dingellgram"' as "more often than not .... a
request for voluminous piles of documents, telephone logs and memos-a sure
sign that the receiving agency has done something to stir the appetite of
Dingell's crack staff of lawyers, whose penchant for investigatory detail is legend"); Nash, The Power of the Subpoena, N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 1986, at A24,
col. 4 (describing Dingell as "perhaps Capitol Hill's most zealous investigator
and issuer of subpoenas"). The public communications to Dingell and the subcommittee from various Department of Justice officials assumed no pretense
of deference. See, e.g., Watt Contempt Hearings,supra note 7, at 263-64 (letter
of Dec. 8, 1981 from Assistant Attorney General Robert A. McConnell to Hon.
John D. Dingell). The final committee report hints of personality problems at
the staff level as well. H.R. REP. No. 898, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 68-69 (1982)
(statement of Reps. Moffett, Ottinger, Scheuer, Waxman and Markey). Nonetheless, in colloquies between Dingell and Watt, and between Dingell and Rep.
Marc Marks, ranking Republican on the Dingell subcommittee, the parties
were at pains to emphasize the nonpersonal nature of the dispute. See, e.g..
Watt Contempt Hearings, supra note 7, at 89 (colloquy between Rep. Dingell
and Secretary Watt); id. at 286-87 (statements of Reps. Dingell and Marks);
but see H.R. REP. No. 898, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 68-69 (1982) (statement of Reps.
Moffett, Ottinger, Scheuer, Waxman and Markey) (attributing Secretary
Watt's response to the committee, in part, to "ego," "pique," and "personal
arrogance").
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executive privilege battle, but it is also possible that the executive branch might have done better in delaying subpoena compliance without the loss of good will that resulted.
Notwithstanding the strong Democratic majority, Secretary
Watt, an unpopular figure, did succeed in forestalling any release of the contested documents until he had made the decision that the subcommittee wanted to oversee. Furthermore,
the President's declared interest in nondisclosure was facially
more compelling as a constitutional argument than some of the
positions proffered by earlier administrations in like
146
disputes.
A reasonable hypothesis might be that at least four factors
over which the Administration had some control helped to galvanize the opposition to Watt. First, Watt had been injudicious
in his attempts to control information in other disputes with
the Energy and Commerce Committee and had weakened his
credibility generally. 147 Second, the Attorney General's legal
opinion was extremely broad in its justification of nondisclosure to Congress and, as discussed below, some arguments were
sure to be seen as overreaching. 148 Third, the Attorney General
may have exacerbated his own credibility problem by refusing
to defend the opinion personally. Fourth, lower level executive
branch officials did not take pains to maintain good relations
with legislative staff.
It may have been, of course, that the executive branch
viewed the subcommittee investigation-and the House in general-with as much distrust as the subcommittee majority focused on Secretary Watt. The ultimate strength of the
Democratic majority, however, provided a hedge that the Administration did not have against miscalculations made in the
course of negotiations.
In sum, the Watt dispute does not appear to have been an
146. See Rosenthal & Grossman, CongressionalAccess to Confidential Information Collected by FederalAgencies, 15 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 74, 82-83 (1977)
(discussing former Commerce Secretary Rogers C. B. Morton's abortive attempt to resist disclosing to Congress certain Arab boycott reports filed with
the Commerce Department under the Export Administration Act of 1969, Pub.
L. No. 91-184, §§ 1-14, 83 Stat. 841, 841-47 (1969) (current version at 50 U.S.C.
§§ 2401-2420 (1982)); The Petroleum Import Fee: Department of Energy Oversight: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Government Operations
Comm., 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 193 (1980) (concerning former Energy Secretary
Duncan's abortive resistance to a subpoena for intra-agency documents concerning the President's imposition of an oil import fee).
147. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
148. See infra notes 254-59 and accompanying text.
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efficient process for achieving an appropriate level of disclosure
to Congress in a way that would preserve the branches' ongoing
relationship. The subcommittee ultimately prevailed in achieving access to all contested information, and the Administration,
although it succeeded in resisting disclosure during the decision-making process, suffered significant and unnecessary damage to its credibility.
2.

Anne Gorsuch: Executive Privilege and Law Enforcement

The most celebrated of recent privilege disputes involved
Anne Gorsuch, 49 President Reagan's first Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), who became the first
head of an executive branch agency to be held in contempt of
Congress while in office. 150 The impetus for the contempt citation was Gorsuch's refusal to divulge certain documents to the
Investigations and Oversight Subcommittee (Levitas subcommittee) of the House Committee on Public Works and Transportation, in connection with that subcommittee's investigation
of EPA's administration of the so-called "Superfund" for the
cleanup of hazardous waste dumping sites. The White House
settled the dispute with the subcommittee on February 18,
1983,151 slightly more than two weeks after a federal district
court refused to review the legality of the House contempt cita152
tion before its enforcement.
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, commonly known as the
Superfund Act,153 created a $1.6 billion trust fund to be used
for financing the cleanup of hazardous waste sites and spills of
hazardous chemicals. Among other things, the Act authorizes
the government to act to control a hazardous waste situation
149. During the pendency of the dispute recounted here, Anne M. Gorsuch
remarried and changed her name to Anne M. Burford. Because the earliest
documents discussed herein refer to her only by the name "Gorsuch," that
name is used exclusively throughout this Article for consistency.
150. H.R. REP. No. 435, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1985).
151. Wash. Post, Feb. 19, 1983, at Al, col. 5. The terms of the final settlement were embodied in a March 9, 1983 memorandum signed by Reps. Dingell
and Broyhill and Counsel to the President Fred Fielding. EPA Document
Agreement, 41 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 635 (1983). For another account of the
Gorsuch confrontation, see Note, The Conflict Between Executive Privilege
and CongressionalOversight: The Gorsuch Controversy, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1333,
1334-38.
152. United States v. House of Representatives of the United States, 556 F.
Supp. 150, 153 (D.D.C. 1983).
153. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified in scattered sections of

U.S.C.).
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when a responsible party either cannot be identified timely or
cannot act. Parties responsible for hazardous waste or chemical
spill sites are required to reimburse the government for
cleanup costs and damages to natural resources; noncooperating
parties may be fined treble damages. By executive order, President Reagan delegated his functions under the Act to the EPA
Administrator, who was also designated the responsible official
for enforcement of the Act.'5
In 1982, several House subcommittees commenced investigations of various aspects of EPA's Superfund enforcement.
The Levitas subcommittee, in March 1982, commenced a general investigation of hazardous and toxic waste control, focusing
on the impact of such wastes and their control on American
ground and surface water resources. 155 Of special concern were
an EPA decision to suspend its prior restrictions on disposal of
containerized liquid wastes in landfills that might permit the
migration of such wastes to ground and surface waters and allegations that the EPA was not adequately enforcing the
Superfund provisions against parties responsible for hazardous
waste sites. 156 On September 13 and 14, 1982, subcommittee
staff requested access to EPA's files on enforcement of the
157
Superfund Act and related statutes in so-called Region II.
Despite an early assurance of access,15 8 EPA subsequently informed the subcommittee that it would not make available certain materials in enforcement files connected with active
cases. 159 This dispute eventuated in the contempt citation
against Administrator Gorsuch.
At almost the same time the Levitas subcommittee requested access to EPA files on Region II, the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee (Dingell subcommittee) of the
House Committee on Energy and Commerce requested documents relating to several hazardous waste sites outside Region
II, on which that subcommittee's investigation of enforcement
effectiveness was focusing. 160 Although the Dingell subcommittee's investigation did not spawn any contempt citations of its
own, the coexistence of different EPA oversight hearings and
154. Exec. Order No. 12,316, 3 C.F.R. 168 (1982), reprinted in 42 U.S.C.
§ 9615, at 1444-45 (1982).
GORSUCH REPORT, supra note

155.

See

156.
157.
158.
159.

Id. at
Ia at
Id. at
Id at

160.

See id. at 15.

9.
11.
13-14.
14-15.

61, at 7.
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demands for access to enforcement files seems to have been
critically important to the dynamics of the interbranch negotiation over the Levitas subpoena. The broader range of interested parties made negotiation more difficult because of the
greater number of persons to satisfy, the greater likelihood that
congressional access to EPA files would undermine executive
control generally over the dissemination of information on
Superfund investigations, and the involvement of additional
strong personalities, including Representative Dingell, Secre161
tary Watt's successful opponent.
After the Levitas subcommittee staff demanded access to
EPA enforcement files in September 1982, two weeks of unsuccessful negotiations ensued at the staff level. 162 EPA offered to
permit staff access to its files, subject to prescreening by an
EPA official to maintain the confidentiality of sensitive documents. The offer was declined. On September 30, 1982, the
subcommittee authorized subpoenas to issue for the requested
163
documents.
Throughout most of October 1982, service of the subpoenas
was postponed under EPA assurances of cooperation. 164 EPA
continued to assert confidentiality for a limited class of litigation-related documents, but then reverted to its position of protecting all "enforcement sensitive" documents-apparently as a
reaction to the issuance of a subpoena by the Dingell subcommittee for similar information. On November 22, 1982, the
Levitas subcommittee served a broad subpoena on Gorsuch, demanding the documents and her testimony on December 2,
1982.165
161. Whether the separate Dingell investigation would have made settlement more difficult apart from the alleged intransigence of Justice Department attorneys is a point Congress disputes. According to the 1985 House
Judiciary Committee report on the EPA dispute, the Dingell subcommittee's
minority counsel proposed a settlement that was deemed acceptable by a deputy assistant attorney general in charge of the Land and Natural Resources
Division in mid-October. H.R. REP. No. 435, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 96-103 (1985).
As the 13 Judiciary Committee dissenters noted, however, it was unclear
whether this official ever told any other member of the Justice Department of
the minority counsel's proposal or of his own reaction to it. Id. at 737-38, 77778.
162. Id. at 46-70.
163. Id. at 70.
164. Id. at 10; Hazardous Waste Contaminationof Water Resources (Access
to EPA Superfund Records): Hearing on H. 89 Before the Subcomm. on Investigationsand Oversight of the House Comm. on Pub. Works and Transp., 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. 88 (1982) [hereinafter EPA Records Hearing].
165. GORSUCH REPORT, supra note 61, at 15.
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On November 30, 1982, Attorney General Smith released a
letter to Representative Dingell, justifying the Administration's
refusal to comply with a subpoena for "sensitive open law enforcement investigative files."'166 Smith also forwarded the letter to Representative Levitas to explain EPA's refusal to
comply fully with the latter's subpoena as well. 1 67 On the same
day, President Reagan issued a memorandum to Gorsuch directing that she not divulge documents from "open law enforcement files, [which] are internal deliberative materials
containing enforcement strategy and statements of the Government's position on various legal issues which may be raised in
68
enforcement actions."'
The Attorney General articulated a series of justifications
for the nondisclosure of open investigative files: forestalling
political influence over the conduct of an investigation, preventing the disclosure of investigative sources and methods, protecting the privacy of innocent parties named in investigative files,
protecting the safety of confidential informants, and maintaining the appearance of "integrity, impartiality and fairness of
the law enforcement process as a whole."' 69 Smith indicated
that no assurance of confidentiality from Congress would permit the President to share his responsibility to protect the information in question, 7 0 but nonetheless articulated one
exception to the rule of nondisclosure: "These principles will
not be employed to shield documents which contain evidence of
criminal or unethical conduct by agency officials from proper
review."171
Following the subcommittee's December 2 hearing, General Counsel Brand, on December 8, issued a legal response to
the Attorney General's letter, again challenging each of his assertions as to the limitations on Congress's oversight author166. Att'y Gen.'s Gorsuch Letter, supra note 79, reprinted in GORSUCH REPORT, supra note 61, app. at 37.
167. Letter from Attorney General William French Smith to Elliot H.
Levitas (Nov. 30, 1982), reprintedin GORSUCH REPORT, supra note 61, app. at

36.
168. Memorandum from Ronald Reagan to Administrator, Environmental
Protection Agency (Nov. 30, 1982), reprinted in GORSUCH REPORT, supra note
61, at 42-43.
169. Att'y Gen.'s Gorsuch Letter, supra note 79, reprintedin GORSUCH REPORT, supra note 61, app. at 38.
170. Id., reprintedin GORSUCH REPORT, supra note 61, app. at 39.
171. Id., reprintedin GORSUCH REPORT, supra note 61, app. at 41.
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ity.1 72 On the same day, Levitas met with Administration

officials to attempt a settlement. Levitas made an offer: subcommittee staff could review and designate for copying and delivery to the subcommittee all EPA documents relative to the
waste sites at issue. If EPA or the Justice Department designated any document selected for delivery as sensitive, it would
remain at EPA for inspection there. If actual delivery to the
subcommittee of any of these documents proved necessary, further subpoenas might issue. All information disclosed would be
treated as confidential. 173
The following day, the Attorney General declined the settlement offer, reiterating instead EPA's original offer of access
subject to EPA prescreening. The only concession was that
prescreened documents would be withheld ultimately from the
subcommittee only after broad-based and high-level review in
the executive branch. 7 4 On December 10, the full Public
Works and Transportation Committee responded by recommending (in a vote along party lines) that the House hold Gor17 5
such in contempt.
Six days later, the House overwhelmingly approved a resolution to certify Gorsuch's "contumacious conduct"'176 to the
United States Attorney for the District of Columbia. 177 Prior to

the actual certification, the Justice Department filed an extraordinary suit in federal district court to enjoin further action
to enforce the subpoena on the ground of its uncon78
stitutionality.
The District Court on February 3, 1983 dismissed the Justice Department's suit on the ground that any constitutional issue raised by the subpoena could be resolved in a judicial
proceeding brought to enforce the subpoena. 179 With the
United States Attorney's Office still insisting that it was not
172. See House General Counsel's Gorsuch Memorandum, supra note 61,
reprintedin GORSUCH REPORT, supra note 61, app. at 58-64.
173. GORSUCH REPORT, supra note 61, at 20-21.
174. Id. at 21-22.
175. Id. at 23. But see id at 72-76 (dissenting statement of Republican committee members).
176. H.R. Res. 632, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC. 10,040 (1982).
177. Davis, Gorsuch Contempt Charge Puts Focus on Enforcement of Hazardous Waste Laws, 40 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 3162 (1982).
178. See Davis, Legal Showdown Escalating in Gorsuch Contempt Case, 41
CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 11 (1983).
179. United States v. House of Representatives of the United States, 556 F.
Supp. 150, 153 (D.D.C. 1983).
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bound to enforce the subpoena, 8 0 Levitas and Reagan reached
agreement on February 18, 1983 that the subcommittee would
receive edited copies of all relevant documents and a briefing
on their contents and then would be permitted to review any
8
requested unedited documents in closed session.' '
Although the February 18 settlement resolved the Levitas
dispute, it did not end the overall imbroglio. Still pending
were subpoenas from the Dingell subcommittee, which now asserted that its investigation was focusing on specific allegations
82
Rita Lavelle, the Superfund
of misconduct by EPA officials.'
administrator and the most prominent of these officials, was
dismissed on February 7, 1983 by the President amid allegations
to Congress and improper administration of the
of her perjury
83
trust fund.
Following the agreement with Levitas on February 18, further disclosures of possibly criminal conduct at EPA made prolonged resistance to the Dingell subpoenas politically
impossible.'8 4 On March 9, 1983, Anne Gorsuch resigned as
EPA administrator' 8 5 and the White House agreed to deliver all
subpoenaed documents to the Dingell subcommittee, subject to
certain limited protections for the confidentiality of enforce180. It appears that the decision not to proceed with the contempt citation
was made independently by the U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia.
See H.R. REP. No. 435, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1985). That decision, however,
reflected long-standing Justice Department policy. Memorandum from Theodore B. Olson, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, for the
Attorney General Regarding Whether the United States Attorney Must Prosecute or Refer to a Grand Jury a Citation for Contempt of Congress Concerning
an Executive Branch Official Who Has Asserted a Claim of Executive Privilege on Behalf of the President of the United States (May 30, 1984), reprinted
id at 2544-621.
181. See supra note 151.
182. EPA: Investigation of Superfund and Agency Abuses (Part1): Hearings on H. 98 Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the
House Comm. on Energy and Com., 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-7 (1983).
183. Hoffman, Reagan Orders Investigation of EPA Charges, Wash. Post,
Feb. 17, 1983, at Al, col. 3.
184. The House Judiciary Committee concluded from its investigation that
the disputed documents contained sufficient "signposts" of wrongdoing that
the executive branch should have recognized earlier than February, 1983 that
the assertion of executive privilege in regard to the documents was untenable.
H.R. REP. No. 435, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1985). The report does not allege,
however, that the executive branch withheld the documents after the relevant
officials had actual knowledge of likely EPA wrongdoing, but merely implied
that the officials should have investigated the alleged "signposts" more thoroughly. See id. at 140.
185. Burford Quits As EPA Administrator,Wash. Post, Mar. 10, 1983, at
Al, col. 1.
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ment-sensitive materials. 186
The Gorsuch episode is striking because, in defending nondisclosure, the executive branch was protecting more specific
and legitimate concerns than had been articulated in connection with the Watt matter. These were further specified in a
December 14, 1982 memorandum to the Attorney General from
Theodore B. Olson, Assistant Attorney General in charge of the
Office of Legal Counsel, who hinted at concern that members
of Congress obtaining access to law enforcement files "might
have relationships with potential defendants" in EPA enforcement actions.1 8 7 What weakened the case for nondisclosure was
not the implausibility of the executive's articulated position,
but the strains on the executive branch's credibility wrought by
the Watt affair L88 plus the credibility of the growing allegations
that EPA officials were guilty at least of mismanaging the
Superfund program.
It is risky, of course, to try to infer from one or two
sketches all the characteristics that may be typical of executive
privilege disputes. 8 9 The two just recounted were atypical in
186. EPA Records Hearing,supra note 164, at 371.
187. H.R.REP. No. 968, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 89 (1982). In fact, OLC investigated whether any of EPA's investigative targets in two areas being scrutinized by the Dingell subcommittee were political contributors to Reps. Dingell
or Mike Synar of Oklahoma. H.R. REP. No. 435, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 124-32
(1985). A deputy assistant attorney general in charge of OLC "concluded there
were some potential connections," but "all possible matchups were not pursued" and no use was made of the information. H.R. REP. No. 968, 97th Cong.,
2d Sess. 131 (1982).
188. "[Two matters--an executive privilege controversy involving Secretary of the Interior Watt and prior EPA informational policies with respect to
Congress---... appear to be highly relevant to the [Judiciary] Committee inquiry [into the EPA dispute] because they shaped expectations-and perhaps
motivations-in the EPA controversy itself." H.R. REP. No. 435, 99th Cong.,
1st Sess. 26 (1985).
189. There are currently 92 standing, select and special committees in Congress, and 258 subcommittees of those committees. Assuming that each of
these entities lodges one information request per month with the executive
branch-surely a low estimate-such requests would total 4,200 annually. If,
as it appears, a very large number of information demands are being handled
amicably between the branches, the Watt and Gorsuch episodes may suggest
only a slight degree of human imperfection in an otherwise smoothly operating system. Perhaps the most sensible reform recommendation would be to
determine how the few episodes like those just recounted differ from the 4,198
others, and try to adjust them accordingly.
The available data, however, are insufficient to show whether the disputes
just recounted are sufficiently like those that are amicably resolved to render
the cases comparable. As noted above, the hotly disputed cases are most likely
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their protraction, and perhaps in the degree to which Congress
190
prevailed in its demands. These and other recent episodes,
however, do share a number of notable features.
First, the sketches dramatize the sequence and variety of
procedural steps available to Congress to aggravate or mitigate
the pressure for resolving an executive privilege dispute. The
pattern is not a three-step dance of subpoena, refusal, and contempt citation. In each instance, there was an initial informal
demand, negotiation, a subpoena, further negotiation, a subcommittee vote, further negotiation, a committee vote, and-in the
Gorsuch case-further negotiation, a House vote, and still further negotiation. The subcommittee overseeing Watt both
turned up the pressure on the executive and bought some time
for deliberation by holding hearings on the subject of executive
privilege generally, in addition to the hearings on the substantive problem in dispute.
The two sketches also highlight the possibilities for compromise inherent in the various forms in which access to information may be provided and in the schedules for compliance.
The negotiations involved not just one issue, disclosure, but several issues; namely, the timing, form and conditions of disclosure. If there were objective criteria for gauging the wisdom of
various potential agreements, genuine compromise possibilities
might routinely exist by making tradeoffs among these three
issues.
As precedent, however, the disputes just related send a
mixed message regarding the potential for future accommodation. On one hand, these disputes are part of a body of practical
precedent in which the branches have, however painfully,
found room for accommodation without documented cost to the
public interest. On the other hand, the executive privilege disputes served to illustrate the opportunity and capacity that different branches of government have to develop different
91
In the Watt and Gorsuch
understandings of the relevant law.1
to be those that involve either especially significant subjects of government decision making or especially sensitive political matters, or both. As such, they
are also most likely to attract the attention of high-level officials in the executive bureaucracy, who may more readily perceive the executive branch's stake
in the nondisclosure of information. If this hypothesis is correct, it is irrelevant to the handling of such disputes that thousands of other information demands-demands for nonsensitive information that are handled by low-level
or medium-level bureaucrats-are amicably resolved.
190. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 146.
191. See supra text accompanying notes 21-84.
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disputes, these different conceptions only exacerbated the
branches' antagonism. The following section elaborates a strategy for achieving accommodation more efficiently notwithstanding the branches' deep-seated legal disagreement.

B. THE STRATEGY OF PROBLEM-SOLVING NEGOTIATION
In the last five years, legal scholars have turned great attention to a strategy of dispute resolution that seems ideally
suited to negotiating executive privilege disputes, especially in
light of the branches' different legal understandings and the
virtues of according them individual respect.192 This strategy
has been variously labeled, but is perhaps easiest to understand

as "problem-solving negotiation."1 93 The pioneer work popularizing this kind of approach to dispute resolution was Getting
to YES: NegotiatingAgreement Without Giving In, coauthored
by Roger Fisher and William Ury.194 Whether one utilizes
their version or some other, the key to the approach is making
the parties aware of each others' underlying needs and objectives and attempting solutions that meet a great number of
those needs through expanding the resources available to the
parties for a resolution of the dispute. These aims stand in contrast to what Fisher and Ury decry as "positional bargaining,"
in which "[e]ach side takes a position, argues for it, and makes
concessions to reach a compromise."1 95
In essence, this Article argues that problem-solving negotiation provides a critical opportunity for the political branches
to divorce their processes of legal argumentation from the
192. See supra notes 101-16 and accompanying text.
193. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 10, at 758. For a helpful general review
of recent literature, see Menkel-Meadow, Legal Negotiationw A Study of Strategies in Search of a Theory, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 905.
194. R. FISHER & W. URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT
WITHOUT GIVING IN (1981). The Fisher and Ury text is sometimes criticized as
superficial or unsophisticated. To some extent, such criticisms may be unfair
because the work is largely prescriptive. The book does not undertake a sophisticated modeling of many currently existing negotiations examples because that is not its task. The prescriptive emphasis of Fisher and Ury,
moreover, makes it a helpful tool for organizing the discussion that follows.
Its ideas are readily accessible and may be presented without a degree of preliminary elaboration that might distract the reader from the specific points
this Article offers on executive privilege negotiations. The discussion in this
section, therefore, borrows significantly from the Fisher and Ury framework,
while drawing insight as well from other works-most notably, D. LAx & J.
SEBENIus, THE MANAGER As NEGOTIATOR: BARGAINING FOR COOPERATION
AND COMPETITIVE GAIN (1986).
195. R. FISHER & W. URY, supra note 194, at 3.
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processes of interbranch dispute resolution. The intrabranch
interpretation of law, to the extent it depends on self-interest
at all, should depend largely on long-term institutional interests and on the demands of internal management-and thus, on
what will typically appear to each branch to be matters of principle. The respective political branches' long-term interest in
dispute resolution between themselves, however, is chiefly in
preventing immediate disputes from rendering government administration unworkable. It is therefore in the government's
long-term interest to focus dispute resolution processes on
achieving wise and efficient conclusions to short-term
problems, not on the vindication of legal positions. That is precisely what problem solving should help accomplish.
According to Fisher and Ury, the success of problem-solving negotiation depends on four imperatives: separating the
people negotiating and their relationship from the problem to
be solved; focusing on the parties' "interests," not their "positions"; inventing options for mutual gain; and using "objective"
criteria for choosing among options. 196 They recognize that, because of various circumstances, these guidelines will not always
suffice for amicable agreement. They insist, however, that
some problems typically thought to call for intransigence-for
example, one party's dirty tricks or initial refusal to bargain197
can often be overcome through a problem-solving approach.
It is heartening to note that the most pressing objections
that commentators have urged against the Fisher and Ury approach1 98 seem, whatever their general merits, to be of less
than critical importance in the executive privilege context.
First, it has been suggested that the problem-solving approach
overlooks those aspects of bargaining that are purely distributional-that is, for which one party's gain is necessarily the
other party's loss.1 9 9 In such a situation, there is by definition
no possibility of inventing an option for mutual gain.
196. Id. at 11-12 passim. "Separating people from the problem," of course,
may be useful to any negotiation, whether integrative or distributive. Further,
as discussed below, the recourse to "objective" criteria is not a way of creating
new value for the negotiators, but a recommendation for handling the inevitable distributive aspect of the negotiation in a way that does not undermine its
problem-solving aspects.
197. Id. at 112-49. On helpful strategies to induce another negotiator to undertake problem solving, see Pruitt, Strategic Choice in Negotiation, 27 AM.
BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 167, 187-91 (1983).
198. See, e.g., White, The Pros and Cons of "Getting to YES," 34 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 115 (1984) (reviewing Fisher and Ury text).
199. E.g., id. at 116.
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Although real-life negotiations almost inevitably involve
distributive problems, the Fisher-Ury prescriptions nonetheless
provide a useful antidote to the tendency to exaggerate any dispute's zero-sum2 00 dimension. Congress and the Executive, for
example, are inclined to portray informational disputes as
purely distributional, pitting indivisible demands for disclosure
against indivisible demands for nondisclosure. Such thinking is
misleading. Just as every real-life negotiation is likely to have
its distributive side, most real-life negotiations also pose oppor20 1
tunities for creating some joint value and some mutual gain.
There are, for example, a variety of "goods" at stake in executive privilege disputes: information content, conditions for the
handling of information, timing, and the viability of the
branches' working relationship in general. Expanding the parties' understanding of the range of interests at stake should
profoundly increase the likelihood of a non-zero-sum solution
to their immediate contest.
A second objection may be that Fisher and Ury's emphasis
on "reason" as an alternative to posturing in the selection
among options for dispute resolution 20 2 is naive. Professor
James J. White has written that often resort to "objective criteria" for dispute resolution "will do no more than give the superficial appearance of reasonableness and honesty to one
20 3
party's position."
This observation, however, overlooks three points. First,
giving a superficial appearance of reasonableness and honesty
to both parties' positions at the "pie-cutting" stage of negotiations may be most effective at preserving the atmosphere of
trust and genuine information sharing that are necessary elements during the "pie-enlarging" stage. Even if the endgame
of any negotiation involves a final, zero-sum tradeoff, it is in
the parties' interests to preserve an atmosphere up to that point
that ensures that the final pool of resources is as large as possible. Second, arguing from principle may itself enlarge the pie
to be divided because "[a]cting in accord with . .. a norm or
principle may be of intrinsic interest to one or more of the par200. "Zero-sum" and "distributive" are used to denote bargaining situations
where any party's realization of value implies the loss of value for another
party. "Non-zero-sum" and "integrative" are used to denote bargaining situations where the possibility exists of realizing results that leave all parties better off.
201. D. LAX & J. SEBENIUS, supra note 194, at 145.
202. R. FISHER & W. URY,supra note 194, at 85-88.
203. White, supra note 198, at 117.
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ties. ' 20 4 Such "an acknowledged norm need not be an absolute
value in a negotiation"; it would be sufficient to help serve to
expand the resources for settlement if an acknowledged norm
existed to "be partly or fully traded off against other
205
interests."
Finally, in the executive privilege context, history provides
some antidote to rationalization. The genuineness of either
branch's appeal to objective criteria may be measured, in part,
by the role that those criteria have played in that branch's elaboration of executive privilege doctrine in the past.
This last point is an additional and especially important
reason why it may actually prove helpful to negotiation if each
branch is encouraged as a general matter to work out its own
executive privilege doctrine independently. Each branch's doctrine would then be a source of insight, when disputes arise, as
to what that branch considers its truly significant institutional
interests. Professor White's indictment of the appeal to reason
applies forcefully to the legal opinions in the Watt and Gorsuch
disputes precisely because the parties, however conscientious
they tried to be, had not articulated their views in a manner
that could disinterestedly be touted as law, but instead seemed
to regard the disputes as opportunities to articulate legal argument for strategic advantage.
A third objection to problem-solving negotiation is that, for
negotiations conducted in a legal environment, it is simply not
possible to separate a discussion of the parties' needs-what
Fisher and Ury consider the proper object of discussion-from
a discussion of each party's arguments as to legal entitlement,
that is, their "positions." This is precisely because the parties
are likely to perceive that a vindication of their legal claims is a
cognizable need.20 6 Such an objection is obviously apposite in a
negotiation between private parties, each of which has a legal
position that can be vindicated only by the other's acquiescence
or by third-party imprimatur. It seems less apposite, however,
to negotiations between Congress and the President. As long as
the two political branches can reach resolutions of immediate
disputes, there should be no psychological or institutional obstacle to their "agreeing to disagree" about the law. Again,
their claims that they are asserting the law correctly can be
psychologically vindicated through the application of each
204.

D. LAX & J. SEBENIUS, supra note 194, at 73.

205. Id206.

Menkel-Meadow, supra note 10, at 827 n.283.
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branch's doctrine to its own internal management. There is no
practical need for either branch to acquiesce in the other's legal
interpretation or to insist on judicial approval for its own.
The final obvious objection to the Fisher and Ury presentation of problem solving is its idealism-the world, it might be
said, does not work reasonably. Such an objection, however, attacks problem solving only as a descriptive model, not as prescriptive theory.207 Whether the disputants in the Watt and
Gorsuch matters were successful problem solvers is, indeed,
doubtful. The issue for the future is whether sufficient incentives exist to adopt a more promising approach to interbranch
negotiations along problem-solving lines. This issue will be
taken up in Section D of this Part, after a discussion of how a
problem-solving approach might be implemented and what difference such an approach might have made to past disputes.
C.

IMPLEMENTING THE STRATEGY

1.

Identifying the Branches' Interests

According to Fisher and Ury, "[t]he basic problem in a negotiation lies not in conflicting positions, but in the conflict between each side's needs, desires, concerns, and fears."208 Thus,
"[flor a wise solution," they advise, "reconcile interests, not positions." 20 9 Such a strategy should work for two reasons: first,
for every interest a variety of positions (not merely the first asserted by a party) usually exists that could satisfy that interest;
second, parties typically have more nonconflicting interests
than their positions disclose.2 10
In large measure, this prescription, without elaboration, appears oversimple. As noted above, every real-life negotiation
has a zero-sum aspect. Even if the parties identify the range of
possible solutions that would maximize their joint interests,
they must then choose among those options, and each option
will have different implications for the relative distribution of
joint value between the parties.211 Moreover, the process of
planning any negotiation is inevitably complicated because the
tactics that produce greatest success in the value-creating as207. On the different perspectives from which it is possible to investigate
and describe negotiations, see H. RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 20-25 (1982).
208. R. FISHER & W. URY, supra note 194, at 42.

209. Id. at 41.
210. Id. at 43.
211. D. LAX & J. SEBENIUS, supra note 194, at 156.
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pects of negotiation are in tension with those tactics most productive during zero-sum bargaining.2 1 2 The former benefits
from information sharing, honesty and cooperation; the latter is
furthered by information concealment, disingenuousness and
2 13
other strategizing.
Nonetheless, it is critical not to overlook the prospects that
almost always exist for creating joint value between the parties
to a negotiation and insuring that the pie ultimately divided
represents as much joint gain as possible. An interest-based approach to executive privilege negotiations seems an especially
promising suggestion because, although the negotiations are
often conducted through positional bargaining, many of the
branches' interests are obvious and well-known and can be used
to maximize the parties' joint gains. In general, Congress is
likely to be seeking information for any of three basic reasons:
(1) to facilitate its regular managerial oversight, that is, its
ongoing supervision of the execution of the laws; (2) to facilitate specific legislative deliberations, aimed at the possible
adoption of particular legislative proposals, the possible approval of a treaty, or the like; or (3) to facilitate investigations
of particular allegations of executive branch malfeasance, for
example, in aid of Congress's impeachment power. The Watt
case involved the first and second of these three motivations;
the EPA dispute involved the first and third.
To these interests may be added a congressional interest in
maintaining a general atmosphere of executive cooperation
with Congress. This interest is presumably present at all times,
but is balanced by closely related interests in maintaining an atmosphere of mutual respect and in enabling the President to
perform his job effectively.
Of course, other interests may play a role in individual disputes. For example, if an agency is politically unpopular, an executive privilege dispute may vindicate what some members of
Congress or their staffs perceive as an interest in weakening
the political position of the responsible administrator. This sort
of interest may be reducible, of course, to the three general interests listed above, or it may have a more partisan or personal
aspect. If the congressional antagonists think it in their interest to harass or discredit a cabinet member on partisan grounds,
amicable negotiations may be impossible. If partisan goals are
212. Id at 34-35.
213. Id. at 34-35, 154.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:461

not the dominant interests, however, it is likely that Congress's

needs will relate to the general categories stated above.
The executive branch's interests in controlling information

will be more varied (whether or not weightier). The executive
branch has a strong general interest in maintaining its decisional independence that is balanced by its needs to maintain
congressional support and enable Congress to act effectively in
its designated tasks. Its less overarching interests are exemplified by various grounds specified in the Freedom of Information Act 2 14 for exemptions from the ordinary rule of mandatory
disclosure of executive branch records:
1. Protecting national defense and foreign policy secrets;
2. Protecting trade secrets or confidential financial information;
3. Protecting the candor of intrabranch policy deliberations;
4. Preventing unwarranted invasions of personal privacy, whether of
government officers, employees or private persons; or
5. Protecting the integrity of law enforcement investigations and
2 15
proceedings.

As with Congress, the executive branch, in a particular dispute, may seek to vindicate a more idiosyncratic interest, such
as demonstrating presidential "backbone" to an unduly officious congressional staff. Such an interest, if reducible to one
of the foregoing interests, need not present an intractable problem. If, however, the executive branch wants chiefly to discredit a particular legislator with that member's constituents,
good faith negotiations will obviously be more difficult.
The identification of interests, of course, is only part of successful problem solving. The task remains to motivate the
negotiators to talk about their interests (legislative oversight
versus presidential privacy, for example), rather than about
their positions (divulge versus withhold). Such motivation
seems plausible for the political branches because, in general,
the prospects for cooperative negotiation are enhanced when
the parties involved are repeatedly engaged in dealing with one
another. Indeed, parties who know in advance of the likelihood
of repeated dealings can explicitly set rules for negotiation in
2 16

advance.

Executive privilege disputes thus provide a likely context
in which the parties would be helped by a formal codification of
each side's general interests, as well as a formal commitment to
214. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1982).
215. Id.
216. R. AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 12-16, 130-31 (1984); D.
& J. SEBENIUS, supra note 194, at 165.

LAx
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invoke those interests in highly specific terms should particular
disputes arise. This should not be difficult in theory and does
not require statutory enactment. Congress may state its interests in the form of a concurrent resolution, amendable at Congress's complete discretion. 2 17 The President may state the
executive branch's interests in an executive order, likewise
amendable. If each branch stated its "case" for disclosure or
nondisclosure early and specifically in these agreed-upon terms,
both sides' "positions" might prove more responsible and the
terms of their discussion more productive. Further, the existence prior to any discussion of general statements of the
branches' interests might assist in the recognition of common
would increase the
ground between the branches, which itself
218
prospects for successful problem solving.
2.

Inventing Options for Mutual Gain

The next step in problem solving, once interests are well
analyzed, is to reconcile those interests. The strategy that
Fisher and Ury advance is to "[i]nvent options for mutual
gain."21 9 This involves searching for shared interests that can
be maximized, as well as differing interests that can be
dovetailed, rather than focusing on conflicting interests. Such
an enterprise, also known as "integrative" bargaining, 220 both
narrows the truly difficult area of dispute and creates an atmosphere where constructive bargaining over the hardest problems
is most likely to occur.
Both shared and conflicting interests will likely abound in
executive privilege disputes. Congress and the President have
mutual interests in appearing responsible and cooperative in
pursuit of the public interest. Both branches presumably have
interests in the success of a government initiative that Congress
has authorized and the President is implementing. In some
cases, Congress may perceive a need to obtain information
quickly for oversight purposes, while the executive branch interest is chiefly in preventing congressional disclosure of particular information to the public. In such an instance, it should be
217. Concurrent resolutions are votes by both houses of Congress, which
are not presented to the President for approval and are not intended to have
the force and effect of law. They are distinct from joint resolutions,which are
presented to the President and are functionally identical to bills.
218. Cf.Pruitt, supra note 197, at 179 ("Problem solving seems more feasible the greater the perceived common ground... is." (emphasis omitted)).
219. R. FiSHER & W. URY, supra note 194, at 58-83.
220. H. RAIFFA, supra note 207, at 131.
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possible to dovetail Congress's interest in effective oversight
(and full disclosure to Congress) with the executive's interest
in information control (and ultimate custody of the
information).
The logistical problem, of course, is how to get the
branches to focus during the course of a dispute on options for
mutual gain. Fisher and Ury provide a host of suggestions for
avoiding four common obstacles to integrative bargaining.
These obstacles are: premature judgment; thinking there is but
one "right answer" to be found; assuming erroneously the
existence of a zero-sum game; and having either side regard the
other side's problems as "just their problems, not ours." 221
In the executive privilege context, however, the one suggestion that may prove most constructive is recourse to precedent 2 22 and, again, the possible documentation of precedent. By
this, I do not mean to suggest the normative invocation of precedent that is characteristic of adjudication and of many negotiations-that is, the use of precedent to establish one party's
entitlement to favorable treatment equivalent to the treatment
enjoyed by other parties in substantially similar circumstances.
I mean instead that data on previous negotiations can be useful
to current brainstorming by providing reminders that the
branches' interests can be dovetailed and by illustrating at least
some of the possibilities for doing so.
In various disputes, for example, the two branches have ultimately reconciled their interests in the following ways:
1. Executive acquiescence in Congress's demands;
2. Executive acquiescence in Congress's demands, but in timed
stages;
3. Executive release of all information, but under protective conditions, ranging from promises of continued confidentiality to congressional inspection of the material while it remains in executive
custody;
4. Executive release of all information, but with limited expurga223
tion or "redaction";
5. Executive release of information in summary form, but with selected sampling to satisfy Congress of accurate summation;
6. Executive release of summary information only; or
7. Congressional acquiescence in executive nondisclosure.

The existence of such a variety of techniques for control221. R. FISHER & W. URY, supra note 194, at 59.
222. Id. at 81-82.
223. "Redaction" is a term commonly used in government to refer to the
expurgation from a document of all information that might identify the individuals who prepared or are discussed in the document.
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ling the timing, content, and conditions of disclosure should be
highlighted in any interbranch modus vivendi on executive
privilege. The branches could commit themselves to explain, in
negotiation, not only their specific interests, but how those interests would be advanced or compromised by each of these
strategies and others that may arise through "brainstorming."
Comparing and contrasting the two branches' specific responses
to a variety of strategies might profitably and quickly reduce
their area of disagreement.
3.

Separating People from the Problem

The first suggestion Fisher and Ury proffer in the elaboration of their prescribed negotiations method is to "[s]eparate
the people from the problem." 2 24 They point out: "Most negotiations take place in the context of an ongoing relationship
where it is important to carry on each negotiation in a way that
will help rather than hinder future relations and future negotiations." 225 For this reason, Fisher and Ury strongly advise
avoiding an entanglement of the parties' relationship in the dispute over substance. To this end, they argue against making
the quality of the relationship depend on the outcome of the
substantive negotiation. The parties to a dispute are urged, instead, to "[b]ase the relationship on accurate perceptions, clear
forward-looking,
communication, appropriate emotions, and a 226
purposive outlook," independent of substance.
In applying this advice to the executive privilege context,
there is an important distinction to note between the institutional relationship between the political branches and the personal relationships among the persons acting on each branch's
behalf. The institutional relationship is part of the substance of
executive privilege disputes, and it is therefore impossible to
separate the substance of the disputes from that relationship.
The advice is pointedly apt, however, with respect to the personal relationships among the individuals negotiating. People
who have been involved in interbranch negotiation would
surely testify that the potential for ill will and inefficiency is
everpresent where committee staff and agency staff permit ego
to overtake substance.
To make that point, however, is to highlight the difficulty
in finding a structural solution to this particular problem.
224. R. FISHER & W.
225. 1& at 20.

226. Id- at 21-22.

URY,

supra note 194, at 11; see also id. at 17-40.
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Fisher and Ury proffer a host of suggestions to help "separate
the people from the problem," but all are behavioral suggestions directed at what might be called the "micro" level of negotiation, that is, the actual face-to-face encounter of
bargainers. 227 Thus, their implementation would seem to depend largely on the personalities of the individuals engaged in
bargaining. If a staff person is someone who might politely be
called an egomaniac, it is doubtful that negotiations will benefit
much from an executive order requiring agency representatives, say, to "[m]ake emotions explicit and acknowledge them
as legitimate." 228
Moreover, structural interbranch problems exacerbate the
human tendency--distressingly evident in the halls of powerto place ego first. In particular, although the political branches
have an ongoing relationship to which negotiators should be attentive, responsibility for negotiating executive privilege disputes is widely diffused on Congress's side. Fortuity alone
determines the degree of sensitivity to the interbranch relationship that has been internalized by the particular member or the
member's staff responsible for negotiation.
In contrast, executive privilege negotiations on the executive side are focused predominantly in the White House and in
the Office of Legal Counsel of the United States Department of
Justice. Other problems aside, the involvement in these disputes of a few key actors who are routinely exposed to the full
breadth of issues on which Congress and the executive are interdependent should provide a strong likelihood that executive
branch negotiators will have both internalized psychologically
the importance of the interbranch relationship and learned the
importance of subordinating their personal emotional needs to
the dictates of a sound interbranch relationship. 229
If Congress could likewise centralize responsibility for executive privilege negotiations, at least once negotiations pass
the most informal level, the routine involvement on both sides
of a predictable group of actors would greatly assist in separating people from the substantive problems presented. 23 0 The
227. Id. at 21-40.
228. Id. at 31.
229. Cf.D. LAx & J. SEBENIUS, supra note 194, at 166 (stressing the significance, in fostering integrative bargaining styles, of socializing new organizational recruits into cooperative norms).
230. Frequency of interaction is a centrally important condition for promoting cooperation in the kind of negotiating context that Congress and the
executive branch face. Establishing hierarchy and organization especially
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likeliest repositories for such responsibilities are the offices of

the Speaker and Senate Majority Leader or the offices of the
chairs of the respective Committees on the Judiciary. The former are preferable because, like the President (and his Attorney General), the Speaker and Majority Leader (and their
staffs) should be most deeply aware of the full range of issues
under consideration by the two branches and of the importance
of an overall pattern of cooperation. The latter, however, have
the possible advantage of deeper immersion in the relevant
with the Delegal issues and the greatest day-to-day interaction
231
partment of Justice on other problems.
Centralizing negotiating responsibility in some particular
office in each house of Congress would greatly reduce whatever
distortion is worked in negotiations by the limelight-seeking
tendencies or personal idiosyncrasies of the member or staff
person who happens, on a given day, to become involved in an
information dispute. Unfortunately, this kind of centralization
helps to increase contacts between individual bargainers. R. AXELROD, supra
note 216, at 12-16, 130-31 (1984).
Professor Axelrod has designed a number of fascinating experiments that
suggest reasons why repeat interactions facilitate cooperative bargaining. In
effect, he set up a game situation in which two negotiators clearly face the
Prisoner's Dilemma-that is, noncooperative behavior is each bargainer's only
possible route to maximizing personal gain and avoiding maximum personal
loss, but only mutually cooperative behavior can maximize the joint gain. He
then invited game theorists to submit strategies embodied in computer programs for playing the game. No matter how sophisticated the strategies became, the most successful strategy was simple: offer cooperation first;
cooperate repeatedly so long as the other party cooperates; on every occasion
when the other party fails to cooperate, retaliate; as soon as the other party
returns to cooperation, forgive its noncooperation by returning to cooperation
also. See D. LAX & J. SEBENIUS, supra note 194, at 158-60.
Although such experiments can be only suggestive because they operate
in an artificially limited environment, their implications are intriguing. They
suggest that joint gains are maximized when the parties play by simple, mutually understood rules that underscore a willingness to cooperate plus a determination to retaliate against noncooperation. Repeat negotiations among the
same parties would likely maximize the prospects for reaching such an
understanding.
231. It may seem quixotic to hope members of Congress would ever delegate significant authority to one committee to affect the operations of another.
Intercommittee cooperation, however, is not unknown. Indeed, the still ongoing imbroglio over EPA records involves an investigation conducted by the
House Judiciary Committee of the executive branch's conduct vis-a-vis the
House Committees on Public Works and Transportation and on Energy and
Commerce. See generally H.R. REP. No. 435, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (four
volumes). The Judiciary Committee investigation, which alleges significant
executive branch misconduct, occurred at the apparent behest of the other
committees. 1 id at 5.
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runs directly against Congress's recent centrifugal tendencies 232
and, as discussed below, is likely to meet resistance. 233
4.

Invoking Objective Criteria for Dispute Resolution
The final aspect of the Fisher and Ury approach involves
the "distributional" aspect of bargaining, that is, where one
party's gain will be the other party's concession. As noted earlier, Fisher and Ury recommend using objective criteria rather
than a test of wills. They argue that "[a] constant battle for
dominance threatens a relationship. '234 It is, therefore, "far
easier to deal with people when both... are discussing objective standards for settling a problem instead of trying to force
each other to back down. '235 As noted earlier, 236 this suggestion does not pertain chiefly to the problem-solving aspect of a
negotiation. Its aim is to constrain the parties' conduct of the
distributive aspect of the negotiation in a way that does not undermine the prospects for problem solving.
As Panglossian as this may sound to the cynical, it should
be easier for government institutions to approach disputes in
this manner than for many private bargainers to do so. First,
the branches would be aware of the incentive for principled discussion, namely, maintaining the best atmosphere for achieving
whatever joint gains are possible through negotiation. Further,
as noted above, 237 precedent exists as a source of criteria
outside the parties' immediate dispute, by which it becomes
possible to judge the practicability of possible resolutions to the
current dispute. 238 For example, in a dispute over information
that the executive branch and Congress agree can acceptably be
shared with a congressional committee in executive session, the
only issue for resolution is whether all copies of the material
will return to the executive branch following disclosure. Discussion could turn to like disclosures in the past. The committee's counsel might then say: "We handled the Smith matter
last year in the way we now propose. In what way do the two
232. See, e.g., Broder, supra note 5 (citing the common criticism that "Congress has become bogged down in the intricacies of its own process, the diffusion of its own power and the increase of its own workload," id at 9, col. 4).
233. See infra text accompanying notes 267-68.
234. R. FISHER & W. URY, supra note 194, at 86.
235. Id.
236. See supra notes 199-205 and accompanying text.
237. See supra text accompanying note 222.
238. The recognition of relevant features from prior interactions is necessary for sustaining cooperation between recurrent bargainers. R. AXELROD,
supra note 216, at 139.
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cases differ? Is this information more sensitive? Did anything
subsequent to your disclosure of information last year belie the
wisdom of that settlement?"
In further illustration, if Congress agrees with the executive branch that it needs only summary versions of the demanded information at the present time, the dispute concerns
only the extent to which Congress may compare representative
summaries with the underlying documents to ensure authenticity. The Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Office of
Legal Counsel might then say: "For the Jones investigation, we
allowed you to check one of every 20 summaries. Is the information we are now providing any less likely to be accurate than
the Jones files? Has anything occurred to suggest the insufficiency of the sampling in Jones for your purposes?"
These examples demonstrate that the use of past executive
privilege dispute resolutions as benchmarks for current reasoning can foster discussion about reasons for disclosure or nondisclosure, rather than simply assertions about what each side is
entitled or willing to do.
5.

The Prospects for Third-Party Intervention

This Article has used the Fisher and Ury model to sketch a
possible approach to executive privilege decisions based on
problem solving. The issue remains whether this approach,
even if implemented, would successfully conserve the branches'
time and effort. The problem remains that negotiations might
bog down if the prospect of ultimate resort to the courts pushes
the branches to view their positions as preludes to litigation,
rather than as attempts to solve immediate problems reasonably. Relatedly, one or the other branch might simply view delay as a sufficient interest to warrant prolonging the dispute for
239
the sake of delay alone.
To avoid these problems, among others, the political
branches might consider the option of inviting third-party intervention. Facilitating this suggestion is the one aspect of the
239. Both the Watt and Gorsuch disputes were primarily disputes over the
timing of disclosure. Recall that Secretary Watt voluntarily released most of
the contested documents once his decision on Canada's status under the Mineral Lands Leasing Act had been made. See supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text. Similarly, the executive branch position sought to protect the EPA
documents because of their relevance to ongoing law enforcement investigations. See supra notes 166-71 and accompanying text. Implicitly, the conclusion of those investigations would likewise have permitted the release of many
of the EPA documents, even under the executive branch's view of privilege.
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plan advanced here that requires statutory enactment. Legislation might authorize individual members of the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit or of the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia, chosen at random as the need arises, to act as nonbinding
mediators of executive privilege disputes. 24 0 Although policy
reasons exist for opposing the use of judges for such nonadjudicative business,24 1 it seems plain that no mediator who lacks
the status of coequal authority with the bargaining branches
could play a mediating role effectively. The participation of
such a mediator might facilitate dispute resolution in a variety
of familiar ways: by assisting the parties in their analysis of interests and of precedent, by providing an avenue for the parties
to express their genuine interests or positions at low risk, by facilitating the flow of information between the parties, by enhancing the parties' creativity, by reducing their differences
240. A significant issue arises, of course, whether Congress may assign article III judges nonarticle III tasks. Under the Supreme Court's current functional approach to separation of powers issues, there would be no absolute bar
to such assignments; they could be imposed, however, only in a way that would
not interfere with the constitutionally required duties of the article III courts.
Compare In re President's Comm'n on Organized Crime, 763 F.2d 1191, 1197
(11th Cir. 1985) (holding that, under the functional standard, the imposition of
investigative powers on the President's Commission on Organized Crime renders unconstitutional the inclusion of article III judges among its members)
with In re President's Comm'n on Organized Crime Subpoena of Nicodemo
Scarfo, 783 F.2d 370, 380-81 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding that the presence of article
III judges on the President's Commission on Organized Crime does not interfere with the judges' article III obligations and is therefore not unconstitutional); cf. Hobson v. Hansen, 265 F. Supp. 902, 919 (D.D.C. 1967) (upholding a
District of Columbia statute requiring district court judges for the District of
Columbia to appoint members of the Board of Education). Such conflicts
might well be avoided through the disqualification of mediator-judges in any
subsequent cases before the D.C. Court of Appeals that involve the issues they
mediated.
241. For example, in a situation such as the present where different political parties control the house of Congress that would be demanding information and the White House, any judge selected to play a mediator's role
necessarily would be an appointee from one or the other major political party.
This could significantly undermine the branches' willingness to view judges as
suitable mediators. Letter from Martin F. Richman to Peter M. Shane (Oct.
20, 1986) (discussing earlier draft of this Article). Additionally, although providing for the mediator's recusal in any subsequent judicial proceeding concerning a particular dispute avoids the immediate conflict-of-roles problem,
the parties may perceive that other judges may be so little disposed to secondguess any compromise that they know their mediator-colleague suggested as to
eliminate the utility of later judicial review. Letter from Peter L. Strauss to
Peter M. Shane (Oct. 16, 1986) (discussing earlier draft of this Article). This
latter problem might be partially addressed by keeping the mediator's recommendations out of the record of any subsequent judicial proceeding.
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through the deflation of unrealistic expectations or by suggesting avenues of agreement, or by blunting the escalation of
conflict and lending further seriousness of purpose to the at242
mosphere of negotiations because of the judge's own prestige.
The most critical functions a mediator may perform, however, are giving the parties the benefit of outside advice without
binding litigation and helping to avoid fruitless protraction of
negotiations that have reached an impasse. The latter may be
accomplished by vesting in the mediator the power to declare
such impasse (leaving Congress, if it wishes, to press its subpoena), which would encompass the power to impose strict
deadlines for the course of negotiation. This power could have
enormous impact in preventing the unproductive expenditure
of time and human resources over an intractable dis243
agreement.
6.

Would Problem Solving Make a Difference?

Postponing for the moment the obvious question whether
the approach thus outlined would ever be implemented by Con242. See H. RAIFFA, supra note 207, at 218-34.
243. Professor Bruff has suggested an alternative strategy for prompting
negotiations-namely, authorizing any congressional committee dissatisfied
with the executive to seek authorization from its chamber to pursue a declaratory judgment suit to determine the dispute. The judge in any such case
would be empowered to play a binding mediator's role analogous to the role
played by the panel in United States v. AT&T, 567 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1977),
compelling whatever measures are necessary to facilitate the best interbranch
compromise. Letter from Harold H. Bruff to Peter L. Strauss (Sept. 24, 1986)
(discussing earlier draft of this Article).
Professor Bruff's suggestion is an appealing one in two respects. First,
whenever the procedure is invoked, the judge, as a mediator with powers of
compulsion, might be situated as a resource either side could invoke to retaliate against noncooperative bargaining by the opposing branch. Second, at the
very least, some such procedure is a manifestly neater way of bringing a dispute to closure than is the contempt process, a disposition which, given the
Gorsuch experience, does not seem satisfactory.
Professor Bruff's suggestion is problematic, however, as a remedy for the
kind of positional bargaining identified in this Article. The reason for this is,
simply, that the declaratory judgment procedure can have its salutary effects
only if invoked-and the compulsory powers a judge has in such a suit provide
a substantial disincentive for invoking it. Inviting binding arbitration is riskier
than inviting nonbinding mediation, and Congress may be reluctant to sue as
long as the committee believes it has a good a chance of striking a favorable
deal informally. The implication of that prediction is that the invocation of
the declaratory judgment proceeding would be preceded by exactly the same
bargaining that now goes on prior to a contempt citation and, without reform,
that bargaining is no more likely to be cooperative.
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gress and by the President, 244 a preliminary question arises:
what difference would the approach make? Any answer to that
question must necessarily be speculative, and, of course, the
right answer may vary from dispute to dispute. Hopeful, positive answers are suggested, however, by reflection on the Watt
and Gorsuch matters, which likely would have transpired differently in some respects under a problem-solving regime.
There are at least four measures of the quality of a negotiation, and it is necessary here to distinguish among them. A negotiation may be characterized by its substantive outcome, the
amount of time it consumes, its immediate impact on the parties' relationship, and its longer term impact on the parties' relationship. As to the first two measures, problem solving would
probably have made little difference in the Watt and Gorsuch
matters. As to the latter two measures, the impact could have
been substantial.
The measure of the Watt and Gorsuch disputes that would
likely have varied least with a problem-solving approach is
their substantive outcomes. In the Gorsuch matter, the executive branch articulated a weighty and concrete justification for
nondisclosure that could not lightly be dismissed. Once probable cause existed, however, to suspect criminal wrongdoing by
the Superfund administrator, the executive branch would have
been compelled by its own articulated principles to disclose to
Congress all information relevant to her management of the
Superfund. Thus, the existence of administrative corruption
foreordained eventual disclosure of all the information Congress sought, regardless of any reasons that might otherwise
have been proffered to justify nondisclosure.
Similarly, in the Watt matter, eventual disclosure of all the
information demanded was foreordained once Watt made his
statutorily authorized decision and the executive branch interest in protecting the integrity of that decision was mooted. Despite the plausibility of executive claims to privilege for
intrabranch deliberative documents and documents relevant to
foreign policy making, the matter under investigation fell
squarely within Congress's express and exclusive power "[t]o
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations. ' 245 Absent a military
or state secrets claim, which was not made, Congress's articu244. This issue is addressed in Section D, infra notes 260-68 and accompanying text.
245. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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lated need for the information in question could not persuasively be gainsaid.
Whether time might have been saved in the disputes is also
a problematic issue in gauging the success of the branches' negotiation techniques. Seven months elapsed between Watt's initial testimony to Congress indicating an unlikelihood of full
disclosure and the Administration's final response and five
months elapsed between subpoena and compliance. Although a
problem-solving regime might have saved some time, the protection of some of the demanded information until Watt had
time to make his statutory decision would have been a likely
feature of a compromise solution. If this hypothesis is correct,
full disclosure still would have taken a period of months.
The Gorsuch dispute consumed less time. Only five
months elapsed between initial demand and full disclosure, and
three months between subpoena and compliance. By government standards, this timing is probably not remarkably inefficient. More to the point, the timing of full disclosure in the
Gorsuch case was controlled largely by extrinsic events, especially the discovery of proof implicating Rita Lavelle in perjury.246 Had it been possible to negotiate a solution in less time
than that actually taken, that solution might not have entailed
full disclosure. On the other hand, once Lavelle's possible offense became known, full disclosure would likely have been irresistible in any event.
One aspect of these negotiations that problem solving could
well have improved, however, is their immediate impact on the
branches' interrelationship. In the Gorsuch matter, a commitment to problem solving might well have obviated the House
vote of contempt and the executive branch's futile and provocative attempt to enjoin enforcement of the congressional subpoena. This hypothesis is based on the likely impact of
mediation in sustaining the executive's claim to some nondisclosure, at least during the period prior to Lavelle's incrimination. 247 In the Watt matter, commitment to problem solving
might well have averted the patent loss of good will resulting
246. See supra notes 183-86 and accompanying text.
247. The recent Judiciary Committee investigation into the withholding of
the EPA documents from Congress concluded that the Department of Justice
knew earlier than February 1983, when the executive privilege claim was
abandoned, that there were substantial reasons to suspect EPA wrongdoing.

See H.R. REP. No. 435, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10, 20-22 passim (1985). Such
knowledge should have ended the privilege claim under the executive branch's
own view of executive privilege.
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from the parties' posturing and ego involvement. Notwithstanding public testimony by Secretary Watt and Chairman
Dingell disavowing any personal animosity,248 one need not be
a literary interpreter as sophisticated as Levi-Strauss to divine
in the text of even the public hearings an air of petulance and
arrogance on Watt's part and the Committee's conspicuous resentment of it. 249 When the further issue developed whether
the Attorney General would testify personally regarding his
opinion supporting Watt, relations only grew worse.
Finally, a problem-solving approach might well have obviated those aspects of the negotiations that will likely have longterm impacts on the branches' interrelationship, impacts that at
least one branch is bound to find unfortunate. The Justice Department's abortive effort to enjoin the congressional contempt
citation in the Gorsuch case resulted in precedent unfavorable
to future executive branch attempts to fight contempt citations
outside the bounds of a criminal enforcement proceeding. A related circumstance of equal misfortune to the executive branch
was the doubt cast on its credibility by the United States Attorney's unwillingness to proceed on a contempt citation as was directed by statute. 250 Should the executive branch ever seek
relaxation of the "independent counsel," or special prosecutor,
provisions of the Ethics in Government Act, 25 ' for example,
this episode is likely to be heavy ammunition in the direction of
greater congressional stringency concerning the regulation of
prosecutions of high government officials.
In the Watt case, the deleterious long-term effects emanate
from former Attorney General Smith's formal opinion in support of the legality of Watt's nondisclosure. However sincere
the writer's (or ghostwriters') views, the opinion appears to be
a one-sided brief, uttered in a context where the executive
branch case for nondisclosure was weak on the facts. 25 2 It evidences the kind of immoderation that is threatened by a strategic and adversarial attitude towards legal interpretation. To be
248. See Watt Contempt Hearings,supra note 7, at 89; see also supra note
145.
249. See, e.g., Watt Contempt Hearings, supra note 7, at 75, 87-88 (colloquies of Sec. Watt and Rep. Dingell); see also H.R. REP. No. 898, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. 68-69 (1982) (noting Watt's display of personal arrogance as unprecedented among Cabinet officers).
250. See H.R. REP. No. 435, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1985); see supra note
180.

251. 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-598 (1982).
252. See supra notes 126-31 and accompanying text.
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sure, moderation is not the outstanding characteristic of the
congressional statements on the Watt matter either, but the
core legal position underlying those statements is better
253
grounded in conventional legal understanding.
As summarized above, 2 5 the conclusion of the Attorney
General's opinion favorable to Watt rested largely on two
highly controversial assumptions. The opinion concluded that
Congress's general oversight interest in information is a weaker
interest than that involved when specific legislative proposals
are at issue. 255 The opinion also asserted that Congress's oversight interest will support a demand for predecisional documents "only in the most unusual circumstances. '256 Even
within the body of the Attorney General opinions, these premises are not supported and, indeed, the Attorney General cites
no support. They are novel and, as discussed below, are not
supported by logic or policy.
First, it seems odd to suggest that Congress's need for information is less compelling when it is trying to decide if any
action is needed than when it is trying to decide whether particular proposed action is wise. Proceeding from the general contemplation of action to specific proposals would seem to be
especially dependent on recourse to helpful information. As
the Attorney General himself noted, Congress is far less likely
to be able to demand information with precision at the oversight or general-contemplation-of-action stage than at the con257
crete proposal stage.
Neither is there Supreme Court precedent supporting the
Attorney General's position. Congress's oversight and legislative deliberations are both authorized in aid of its specifically
enumerated powers in article I, section 8 of the Constitution. A
hearing connected with Congress's enumerated power to regulate foreign commerce embodies its constitutional interest in
the implementation of that power, whether the hearing is an
"oversight" hearing or a deliberation over legislative proposals.
253. The statement of the General Counsel to the House Clerk on the Gorsuch matter is more open to criticism because of its failure even to address the
applicability of executive privilege decisions that would seem to favor the executive branch position. See House General Counsel's Gorsuch Memorandum,
supra note 61, reprintedin GoRsUcH REPORT, supra note 61, app. at 58.
254. See supranotes 126-31 and accompanying text.
255. Att'y Gen.'s Watt Opinion, supra note 7, at 30, reprintedin Watt Contempt Hearings,supra note 7, at 106.
256. Id., reprintedin Watt Contempt Hearings,supra note 7, at 107.
257. See id., reprintedin Watt Contempt Hearings,supra note 7, at 106.
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Likewise, the Attorney General's insistence that Congress
will have "a legitimate need to know the preliminary positions
taken by Executive Branch officials during internal deliberations only in the rarest of circumstances" 258 is defensible only
where it refers to information demands that occur while the internal deliberations are ongoing, a point he fails to stress. After
decisions are made, Congress would presumably find it routinely beneficial to trace the course of deliberations, as well as
the decision's results, to evaluate the quality of executive
branch decision making. Congress is responsible not only for
authorizing most of the administrative discretion that the executive branch enjoys, but also the totality of its funding.
Although countervailing considerations may augur for nondisclosure in particular cases, it hardly seems illegitimate as a general matter for Congress to inquire into the process, as well as
the results, of decision making.
Even if the Attorney General's argument were better
founded, the context in which he rendered his opinion underscores its one-sidedness. As noted, Congress's inquiry was
within the core of a specifically vested congressional power.
Congress's demand for a military secret, for the background file
respecting a presidential pardon, or for other information similarly related to an undoubtedly exclusive presidential authority
would surely have presented a better occasion to make "new"
constitutional law. It is doubtful whether future Attorneys
General will use the Smith opinion as authority. Worse, it is
probable that the Smith opinion created a justifiable impression
that it was an advocacy document, not a judicious assertion of
law.

259

258. Id. at 31, reprintedin Watt Contempt Hearings,supra note 7, at 107.
Standing alone, the Attorney General's statement is ambiguous. It could be interpreted to mean that, while executive branch policy deliberations are actually going on, Congress will rarely have a legitimate need to know the
executive branch's developing preliminary positions. Alternatively, it could
mean that, at any time, Congress will rarely have a legitimate interest in reviewing predecisional documents. The former position is a far more defensible
view than the latter because, in essence, it disputes only an implicit assertion
by members of Congress that they may actually participate in the administra-

tion of the laws.
259. For an example of a similar embarrassment, never again cited by the
executive branch as authoritative, see the opinion of Attorney General Griffin
Bell asserting the constitutionality of the legislative veto provisions of the Re-

organization Act of 1949. 43 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 10 (Jan. 31, 1977) (approving
statute that provided that a reorganization plan would become effective 60
days after its transmittal to Congress by the President unless either House vetoed plan within 60 days). Compare the executive branch's position on the leg-
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The one-sidedness of the Attorney General's opinion in the
Watt case strongly implied that the executive branch perceived
itself engaged in positional, zero-sum bargaining with Congress,
not in problem-solving negotiation. Congress may have shared,
even engendered, that perception. The executive branch, however, would have been better served had the Attorney General
not articulated his stance as if he viewed the dispute as an occasion for an adversarial expostulation of law. A sensible resolution of Watt's short-term dispute with Congress would have
been more in the executive branch's short-term and long-term
interests.
D. Is REFORM POSSIBLE?
It's a familiar quip in Washington that people come to Congress bemoaning how little gets done and leave amazed that
anything gets done at all. The serious thought underlying this
joke is that Congress is so cumbersome, its processes so complex, and the interests involved so multifarious, that serious reform in any area is difficult to obtain, especially at any time
when reform is less than desperately needed. Adding to these
perceptions the equally strong forces in favor of executive
branch inertia, it may seem wishful thinking to imagine the
political branches adopting any of the foregoing proposals, no
matter how well considered or promising for the future.
In separation of powers disputes, the political branches
may face what the game theorists refer to as the Prisoner's Dilemma. 26 0 In such a setting, the players can maximize their
common utility by cooperating, but three nettlesome conditions
exist. Each player must choose a strategy without knowing
what the other will do. No matter what the other player does,
noncooperation is the only strategy that protects an individual
player against the worse possible consequences for that player.
cooperate, both will do worse than if
Yet, if neither offers26 to
1
both had cooperated.
islative veto in Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919
(1983) (holding a one-House veto provision of the Immigration and Nationality
Act unconstitutional as bypassing constitutional requirements of presentment
and bicameralism).
260. See supra note 230; see also R. AXELROD, supra note 216, at 7-19.
261. To see why the game is called the Prisoner's Dilemma, consider two
criminal suspects, A and B. In separate interrogations, each is told that, if he
testifies against the other, he will get a maximum prison sentence of two
years. If he refuses to testify against the other, but is implicated by the other
prisoner's testimony, he will get a five-year sentence. Both prisoners know
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The political branches have a major advantage in promoting cooperation in such an atmosphere in that they interact frequently.262 Yet, frequent interaction does not guarantee
cooperation. In assessing whether cooperation can be achieved
along the lines suggested in this Article, it is helpful to focus on
two separate questions. First, are there reasons for thinking
this proposal might fare better than past suggestions for reform
in this area? Second, what, in general, are the incentives or disincentives to adopt these recommended changes?
In reaction to President Nixon's abundant recourse to executive privilege, Congress considered in the early 1970s a variety of bills to regulate at least some aspects of the process of
demanding information from the executive branch. 263 One
such bill actually passed the Senate. 264 Most such proposals
either formalized the requirement for a presidential claim of
executive privilege or provided for judicial review should Congress and the President reach an impasse. A thoughtful report
of the Committee on Civil Rights of the Association of the Bar
of the City of New York, based on a detailed study of the history of and rationale for executive privilege, recommended
265
both steps.
Two good reasons exist to believe that the problem-solving
approach outlined above incorporates features that would be
more attractive to both branches than these prior recommendations. First, the approach is largely adoptable, as mentioned
above, by a complementary congressional resolution and presidential executive order. 266 Such a procedure would formally
preserve each branch's claim to plenary authority over executive branch information and permit each branch the formal option of backing out if the modus vivendi breaks down. Second,
that, if each refuses to testify, they will both go free. The dilemma arises because, although A and B can minimize their jail time if each refuses to testify,
testifying is the only way A or B can guarantee against the five-year sentence
that is the worst result for either player.
262. See R. AXELROD, supra note 216, at 16.
263. See, e.g., Executive Privilege-Secrecyin Government: Hearings on S.
2170, S. 2378, and S. 2420 Before the Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Relations of the Senate Government OperationsComm., 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975)
(discussing whether only the President should have the right to withhold information and whether Congress should have the right to subject such a privilege claim to judicial review).
264. S. 2432, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CONG. REc. 42,101 (1973).
265. Committee on Civil Rights, Executive Privilege: Analysis and Recommendationsfor CongressionalLegislation, 29 REC. A.B. CITY N.Y. 177, 201-03
(1974).
266. See supra notes 217 & 240 and accompanying text.
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it eschews recourse to the courts for dispute resolution. Any
such recourse bodes risks for each branch; problem solving offers promise of dispute resolution without litigative risk.
The prospect that this approach may be more attractive
than earlier proposals, however, does not itself assure that the
incentives for any change will be greater than the disincentives.
The unusual interest in any reform during the early 1970s was
provoked by a particular series of unusual events. Although
the Reagan invocations of executive privilege have been controversial, they have not galvanized anything like the kind of public attention that was focused on Watergate and Nixon's use of
executive privilege generally.
To assess the incentives and disincentives to change, it may
be helpful to distinguish two sets of forces: the incentives or
disincentives with respect to particular proposals, and the incentives or disincentives to do anything at all. If both branches
were willing to deal at all with the executive privilege problem,
there would seem little disincentive to adopt most features of
the outlined proposal. A codification of the kinds of interests
supporting disclosure or nondisclosure would be familiar
enough. The utility and attractiveness of an interbranch commitment to "invent options for mutual gain" or to refer to objective criteria, especially precedent, for resolving hard issues
seem obvious. The chief disincentive for mediation is fear of
the unknown; each branch might predict greater success without the use of mediation than with it. Any such prediction
would be highly speculative, however, and mediation itself
seems to involve very little risk for either branch.
The proposal likely to meet greatest resistance is the proposal for greater centralization of Congress's negotiating "apparatus." Each Congress member's jealousy of his or her own
policymaking prerogatives is a powerful disincentive against
greater institutional coordination. The situation, however, is
not hopeless. On one hand, the increasing entropy of Congress
is an oft-noted and much lamented phenomenon.2 67 Perhaps
the executive privilege area, because it is more exceptional than
routine, might appear to Congress to be an attractive area for
an experiment with greater institutional discipline and
267. Representative Morris Udall, a leading early proponent of congressional reform, has said: "We wanted to democratize the place, and we've done
that, but maybe we overshot a bit .... I think about 75 percent of the Democrats have subcommittee chairmanships; but if everybody's in charge, nobody's
in charge." Broder, supra note 5, at 10, col. 1.
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control.
The hardest question of incentives regarding the problemsolving approach, therefore, is whether sufficient reasons exist
for the two branches to do anything at all to change their approach to these issues. Resolving all executive privilege issues
on an ad hoc basis has an appeal to both branches. The executive branch may fear that a commitment to problem solving
would undermine its ability to manage the outflow of information to maximum political advantage. Congress may fear lending any imprimatur, however indirect, to the legitimacy of
withholding information from the legislative branch. Now that
President Reagan and Congress have interacted for over six
years, the patterns of interaction may be too comfortable to
suggest to either side a major change.
The time for change will probably be ripest on January 21,
1989, when a new President will take office. Although furor
over Nixon's executive privilege policy fueled the last period of
major interest in reform, that interest was sure to take on an
antiexecutive cast. At a moment when the slate is clean, when
each branch is staking out a new relationship with the other,
the prospect of formal commitment to problem solving may
seem most attractive. A new President, whether Republican or
Democrat, could use the proposal as a way of putting the new
Administration at a distance from the problems that the Reagan administration had over information. Congress, whatever
the majority party, could use the proposal as a way of sounding
a constructive note and capitalizing on the good feelings that
typically attend a new presidency. Both sides might see this accommodation on a tough structural issue as a good tone-setting
device for more substantive problems. It is fair to predict that
the country would welcome that change of tone.
In sum, the prospects for reform are not overwhelmingly
favorable, but they do exist. Various features of the proposal
268. There is no blinking the fact that, even if the branches agree to negotiate a modus vivendi on executive privilege, hard substantive issues will be
posed for resolution. An obvious example is how to deal with information in
the possession of so-called independent administrative agencies. Although it is
difficult to distinguish, on the basis of principle or practicality, the President's
appropriate relationship to "independent" or "purely executive" agencies, it is
the lore of independent agencies that they are more within the ambit of Congress than the latter agencies. For a thorough analysis of this set of problems,
see Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government Separationof Powers and
the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573 (1984). Professor Strauss specifically addresses the issue of presidential communication with agencies and congressional regulation of such communications. Id. at 653-62.
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should appeal to both branches, were they to do anything at all.
Whether anything at all gets done may depend on timing. The
start of a new Administration seems the likeliest moment to
try.

CONCLUSION
Since its inception, the government of the United States
has aspired to sometimes conflicting ideals of accountability
and efficiency. Justice Brandeis's famous remark that "[t]he

doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the Convention of 1787, not to promote efficiency but to preclude the

exercise of arbitrary power" 269 does not tell the whole story.

Justice Jackson's observation is at least as important: "While
the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it
also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed
powers into a workable government." 270
Executive privilege disputes with Congress starkly pose the
dilemma between accountability and efficiency. Accountability
is threatened if the executive branch, pursuing its doctrine of
executive privilege, denies Congress information that is important to its oversight and lawmaking functions. Yet, accountability is also threatened when the Executive acts too expediently,
sharing information whenever politically convenient and no
matter how unwisely. The executive branch is accountable, in
other words, both to Congress and to the Constitution.
The question, then, is how to reconcile the demands of accountability and workability in a "government of laws." This
Article suggests that, in the enterprise of constitutional interpretation, both Congress and the executive branch should be
encouraged to crystallize their respective understandings of the
scope of executive privilege into what each branch will regard
as controlling legal doctrine within that branch. Taking seriously its responsibilities to formulate defensible executive privilege law should enable each branch to accommodate its
particular institutional interests within a legal framework that
is justifiable under conventional, legitimate forms of legal reasoning. Following their respective doctrines in pursuing their
internal functions should lead the branches to institutional be269. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
270.

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952)

(Jackson, J., concurring).
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havior that is consistent and responsible, and should foster official allegiance to the "government of laws" ideal.
In the enterprise of interbranch dispute resolution, the
branches should have available to them a problem-solving negotiating strategy aimed at optimizing the pursuit of both
branches' institutional interests without regard to their conflicting legal doctrines. They should be able to turn away from
the elaboration of long-term doctrine to the solution of shortterm problems. When an impasse is so great that no such strategy is workable, that impasse may signal an occasion for the
laws of executive privilege to be recrystallized. Then, and only
then, should it be necessary for a court to step in and substitute
a unitary judicial understanding for the contending positions of
the political branches.

